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Abstract
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (CEEC-3) have undertaken
substantial efforts to build a new financial system under the constraints of
their legacies from central planning. In this study, first we look at the banking
sector. Then we give a description of bond and stock markets. These topics
are complemented by an analysis of the structure of funding for the private
and public sector, of the financial sector’s vulnerability and of the legal
conditions for external finance as well as for banking supervision. We find
that the financial sector and financial intermediation are internationally
integrated already to a large extent. This implies, inter alia, a non-negligible
exposure of the corporate sector to exchange rate risk. While funding via
equity markets remained modest, local currency-denominated debt issues are
important for public financing. Our analysis shows that the legal, supervisory
and regulatory infrastructure of the financial system is formally well
developed, but suffers from enforcement problems. 
4
•  •  •  •
Polen, die Tschechische Republik und Ungarn unternahmen, ausgehend vom
Erbe der zentralen Planwirtschaft, substanzielle Anstrengungen zur
Errichtung neuer Finanzsysteme. Aufbauend auf einer Untersuchung des
Bankensektors sowie der Kapitalmärkte erfolgt eine Analyse der
Finanzierungsstruktur des privaten und des öffentlichen Sektors, der
Krisenanfälligkeit des Finanzsektors sowie der rechtlichen Regelungen für
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data. We are particularly grateful to Peter Backé, Martin Dolecek, Helmut Elsinger, Eduard
Hochreiter, Georg Hubmer, Andreas Netzer, Fritz Novak, Wolfgang Müller, Jürgen Pfister,
Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald, Nora Ruthig, Ágnes Szent-Ivány, György Szapáry, Gertrude
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Eltville. This paper’s findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent the views of the OeNB.externe Unternehmensfinanzierung und Bankenaufsicht. Finanzsektoren und
-intermediation sind bereits in hohem Maße international integriert. Dies
impliziert u.a., dass der Unternehmenssektor einem beachtlichen
Wechselkursrisiko ausgesetzt ist. Während die Finanzierung über den
Aktienmarkt gering ist, sind in nationaler Währung denominierte Schuldtitel
für die Finanzierung des öffentlichen Sektors wichtig. Unsere Analyse zeigt,
dass der rechtliche und aufsichtsrechtliche Rahmen der Finanzsysteme formal
gut entwickelt ist. Es gibt jedoch Mängel bei der praktischen Umsetzung
dieser Standards.Contents
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The economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (referred to in the
following as the CEEC-3) have undertaken substantial efforts during the last
decade to build a new financial system under the constraints of their legacies
from central planning and the initial conditions created by the early policies
in the transition process. In this study we review the development of the
financial system in these countries during the last decade. Since they are
considered as the most advanced group of transition economies, they form
a natural focal point for the analysis of financial system transformation. It is
our aim to provide a broad picture of what has been achieved in this process
during the first ten years.
The importance of the role played by the financial system for the real
economy has been frequently pointed out in the economic literature. It has
a key function in the allocation of resources by channelling funds from
households to enterprises, it provides risk-sharing opportunities for
households and firms and it helps agents economize on transaction and
information costs. Adeveloped financial system is therefore an important part
of economic development in general.
In our discussion we concentrate on four main aspects: First we look at the
banking sector. Second we give a description of the capital markets. Third we
give an overview of the structure of funding for the private and public sector
and of the financial sector’s vulnerability. Finally, we discuss the legal and
supervisory environment.
This focus of our discussion is of course selective as any description of such
a complex structure as “the financial system” has to be. Our selection is
nevertheless not arbitrary and based on the following considerations: Banks
play a particularly important role as providers of external finance in any
financial system. They also have an outstanding importance among financial
institutions. The economic reasons for this prominent role of banks have been
extensively discussed in the literature. (see Freixas and Rochet, 1996). The
broader view that has emerged from this discussion is that financial
intermediaries play a compensating role for economic functions markets can
not fulfil. Thus banks are a natural focal point in the description of financial
institutions. Markets are of course the other big part of any financial system.
They play an important role in the efficient allocation of funds, in providing
7risk sharing opportunities and also in disciplining corporate insiders. The most
important markets for external finance are bond and stock markets and we
confine ourselves to these markets in our discussion. To learn more about the
functionality of the various branches of the financial system in providing
finance to the private and public sector we take a closer look at the structure of
financial intermediation by banks and markets. This analysis also produces
some additional information about the exposure of the financial system to
important risk factors such as exchange rate volatility and short term capital
flows. Finally we discuss the legal and supervisory environment. These
interdependencies between “law and finance” (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997) have only recently received closer attention in the
academic literature. In our study we draw on these recent results and insights
to give a picture of the legal and supervisory environment based on data and
concepts from this literature.
Our study uses various sources of data. Parts of the data were collected by our
own. Some of the data are taken from official publications such as statistical
reports of stock exchanges, central banks and finance ministries as well as
international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank or the EBRD.
A detailed description of the data and the sources are contained in an
appendix. Due to our own data collection and due to the use of new sources
of data we believe that we are able in large parts to give a novel picture of
a topic that has recently been discussed also in other studies (see in particular
EBRD, 1998). Our paper makes systematic use of indicators from the
literature about law and finance for the description of the legal environment
in transition economies.
5 We also use a new database by Barth, Caprio and
Levine (2001) on banking regulation and supervision around the world.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: Though there are some
remarkable differences within the group the general picture that emerges from
our study shows that the first decade of financial system transition in the
CEEC-3 was characterized by impressive progress. However, while the
banking system has been stabilized successfully, it still suffers from past
burdens. We find that the banking sector and the equity market are already
dominated by foreign investors. In corporate finance, domestic foreign
currency-denominated bank lending and foreign cross-border credit have
substantially grown in importance, while funding via capital markets
remained modest. In contrast, in public finance, intermediation through debt
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5 A recent Study by Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) has used these indicators for a larger
group of transition economies.securities markets is very important. While the corporate sector’s exposure to
downward corrections of the exchange rate is not negligible (implying
a certain risk for the banking sector), foreign portfolio holdings of local
currency-denominated debt and equity securities still seem to be at
a non-critical level. With regard to vulnerability, the still small size (relative
to GDP) of CEEC-3 banking sectors and capital markets compared to
developed market economies is an advantage, as the potential costs of
financial destabilization would be limited in size in relation to the real
economy. On the other hand, the growth potential for both segments of the
financial system can be regarded as high. Our analysis shows that the legal,
supervisory and regulatory infrastructure of the financial system is formally
well developed in all of the three countries but suffers from various
enforcement problems. The solution to these problems will be instrumental
for fully realizing the growth potential of the banking sector and the capital
markets and their contributions to real growth in the future.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the banking sector,
section 3 takes a close look at the capital market. Section 4 discusses the
structure of financial intermediation and different sources of funding.
Chapter 5 describes the legal and supervisory environment.
Introduction 92 The Banking System
There is a fairly broad consensus in modern finance theory that financial
institutions and intermediaries, in particular banks, help solve market failures
and play a compensating role for the limitations of financial markets (see
Allan and Gale, 2000; Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Mishkin, 2001). These
limitations result from frictions such as market incompleteness, transaction
costs, externalities and informational asymmetries. Since financial markets in
transition economies are relatively young, despite the spectacular
developments that have taken place in the last ten years, there is reason to
believe that some of these market frictions are still fairly strong (see for
instance EBRD, 1998). Thus the role of banks and financial institutions
within the financial system is relatively important. Besides of these
considerations the picture of the financial system that emerges from modern
finance theory is that it is a complex system of markets and institutions, both
of which fulfil often complementary functions. Indeed banks are among the
key players in most financial market activities. In many countries they play
a prominent role in the mutual funds business, in venture capital finance and
in the organization of exchanges. Even in the U.S. which is considered as
a financial system predominantly relying on markets and where banks are
more narrowly confined to commercial banking, Boyd and Gertler (1994)
have pointed out that the presumed decline of banks since the seventies is
more a measurement problem than a real issue. They find to the contrary that
once data are appropriately corrected one can see an increase in the
importance of banks in the U.S. between the seventies and the nineties. The
banking system is thus a natural focal point in the analysis of financial
institutions.
We provide a description of the banking system in the CEEC-3 concentrating
on the following main aspects. The early phase of transition was mainly
characterized by banking crises and recapitalization programs as well as
considerable structural change in ownership. These developments and their
consequences are described in the first part of this section. In a next section
we describe the size and the structure of the banking sector using some of the
standard measures of the literature – see Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine,
1999. Finally we take a look at the profitability and efficiency of the banking
industry.
112.1 The Early Phase of Transition: Banking Crises,
Recapitalization Programs and Bank Privatization
2.1.1 The Legacy from Central Planning
Under central planning, the financial system was little more than
a bookkeeping mechanism for recording the authorities’ decisions about the
allocation of resources among various sectors and enterprises. At the outset of
transition the following key reforms were implemented: (1) a two-tier
banking system with separate functions for central banks and commerical
banks was introduced instead of the monobank system; (2) sectoral
restrictions on specialized banks were lifted; (3) privately owned banks were
admitted; (4) foreign banks and joint ventures were granted access; (5) the
licensing policy for most kinds of banking business was liberalized; (6) the
legal framework and supervisory system were adjusted.
Alicensing policy that was mostly quite liberal coupled with shortcomings in
the legal framework and supervisory system gave rise to the establishment of
a large number of newly founded banks which often engaged in unsound
practices. The cases of Kreditni Banka and credit unions in the Czech
Republic may serve as examples in this respect. The state-owned commercial
banks (which emanated from the old monobank system), in turn, suffered
from an inherited burden of bad loans. Banking systems generally lacked
capital and banking skills; moreover, political intervention in the activities of
state-owned banks was pervasive. These deficiencies coupled with the
uncertain economic environment prevailing at the beginning of transition
resulted in the quick accumulation of bad loans and – finally – in a number of
banking crises.
2.1.2 Recapitalization Programs
Although not all countries under review experienced fully fledged banking
crises, all undertook large-scale bank recapitalization programs, mostly from
1992 to 1996. While Hungary and Poland had succeeded in stabilizing their
banking systems by 1997 with the help of these programs, the Czech Republic
faced continuing problems. Following the literature, we give a rough estimate
12 The Banking Systemof the costs of these crises by reporting the fiscal cost of bank recapitalization
programs (see Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999, Barth et al., 2000).
6
Although the Czech Republic had concluded a large set of recapitalization
measures by 1997, substantial additional public funds had to be put up to
prepare the country’s largest banks for privatization. Altogether, by 2000 the
total fiscal cost of bank recapitalization since the reforms were launched
amounted to 11.8% of GDP in 2000 in the Czech Republic, as Table 1 below
shows. While some funds may be recovered (e.g. by privatization revenues
for Komercní banka), the figures presented in the table below do not include
the not yet fully known costs of the recent failure of Investicní a Postovní
banka (IPB). According to finance minister Rusnok, these costs are estimated
at CZK 95 billion (about 4.8% of GDP in 2000).
In terms of total costs, Poland was most successful, as the cumulated costs of
bank recapitalization were below 1.5% of GDP in the year 2000. Poland’s
success is attributable to the design of the recapitalization program, which
provided the least incentive for moral hazard, but also to the small size of the
Polish banking sector in relation to GDP. Inter alia, bank managers were
provided with financial incentives for improving the performance of their
banks and the active workout of bad loans was encouraged
7. Besides, it
should be noted that the early tackling of the bad-loan problem decreased
costs in terms of GDPin 2000, which becomes evident from line 3 of Table 1.
Hungary ranges between the Czech Republic and Poland with a fiscal cost of
6.8% of 2000 GDP. The table shows for each country when the main part of
the recapitalization program was completed and reports the fiscal costs of the
recapitalization in percent of GDP in the year of the completion of the main
part of the program as well as in percentage terms of GDP in the year 2000.
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6 Fiscal costs are not unifomly measured in the literature. Usually they include the costs of
recapitalisation and losses incurred through protecting deposits either implicitly or explicitly
through government deposit insurance schemes. Sometimes also costs of corporate
restructuring are included. Thus fiscal costs measures are not always directly comparable. An
alternative measure which is, however, much more ambitious is to describe the direct loss in
output (see Hoggarth, Reis, Saporta, 2001).
7 see Bank Austria (1998) for more details.Table 1: Fiscal Costs of Bank Recapitalization
Czech Hungary Poland
Republic
Main part of recapitalization program completed in 1997 1994 1996
Fiscal costs up to the year indicated above
in % of GDP in that year 8.9% 7.2% 1.6%
Fiscal costs of recapitalization program 
up to the year 2000 in % of GDP in 2000 11.8% 6.8% 1.4%
Source: International Monetary Fund (1998), Kawalec (1999), national central banks, OeNB.
2.1.3 Privatization and Foreign Ownership
Privatizing state owned banks may in principle have benefits as well as costs.
If the supervisory and regulatory regime is very weak or not at all in place or
when a strong disruption of depositor confidence must be expected the case
for swift privatization may be weakened. Overall however general
considerations about the incentive effects of private bank ownership as well
as empirical evidence about privatization (see EBRD, 1997, chapter 4)
support the view that the benefits outweigh the costs. Private ownership of
banks provides better incentives to discipline risk taking behavior of
managers, it limits government intervention into the allocation of credit and
it enhances incentives to improve monitoring and screening technologies for
banks. The latter aspect has been stressed as a particularly important function
of banks by the modern theory of financial intermediation. Banks in this
theory are viewed as institutions mitigating problems of asymmetric
information between firms and financiers by acting as delegated monitors of
firms (see Diamond, 1984). Monitoring activities include the screening of
projects in a situation of ex ante uncertainty about quality (adverse selection),
the prevention of opportunistic borrower behaviour during the
implementation of a project (moral hazard) and auditing borrowers who fail
to meet contractual obligations. The development of these activities is thus
essential for banks to fulfil their intermediation function effectively. Private
ownership of banks enhances the incentives to develop these activities.
Progress in bank privatization differs among the CEEC-3. At the end of 1999,
majority state-owned banks held only 9% of the assets of the banking sector
(excluding the central bank) in Hungary, followed by 23% (exclusive of
Ceská Sporitelna and Komercní banka
8) in the Czech Republic. In Poland, the
state banks had a share of 22% in the total assets of the banking sector
14 The Banking System(excluding the central bank) and a significantly lower share of 13.5% in the
sector’s total equity at the end of 1999.
In the meanwhile, several significant transactions have taken place to reduce
state stakes even further. No major transactions were made in Hungary, where
privatization was most advanced in 1999. However, the government intends
to dispose of direct state ownership of Postabank (the country’s sixth largest
bank in terms of assets), but did not succeed in finding a buyer from the
private sector who was willing to pay enough in its first attempt. Instead,
Postabank is to be sold to the Hungarian Post Office.
After selling a majority stake in Ceska Sporitelna (the country’s largest retail
bank) at the beginning of 2000 to Austrian Erste Bank, the Czech Republic
sold the last significant state stake in a major bank in the course of 2001.
9
In Poland, state ownership of banks underwent only small changes in 2000.
The sale of a 10% stake in Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA w Warszawie
(PBK, rank four in terms of assets in Poland) to Bank Austria Creditanstalt
International gave Bank Austria a controlling majority. The share of state
banks fell only slightly to 21% of the sector’s assets and to 11.5% of the
sector’s equity at the end of 2000. Two major banks, namely the largest
(Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci BP, PKO BP) and the fifth largest bank
(Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej, BGZ) in terms of assets, are still owned by
the state. The government intends to reduce its stake in the former bank, but
wants to keep control of this bank for the time being, while the latter is to be
privatized.
Privatization efforts appear to have been a direct response to continued
problems in running the banks in the Czech Republic, and to some degree in
Hungary, while in Poland the time span between recapitalization and
privatization is larger. The mode of privatization that was chosen in most
cases, namely tender or direct sales to foreign banks, resulted in strong
foreign participation in CEE banking sectors.
The involvement of outside interests mitigates incentive problems that prevail
when insiders dominate. The involvement of outside interests in the form of
The Banking System 15
8 These majority state-owned banks accounted for a share of 15.0% and 15.5%,
respectively, of total banking sector assets at the end of 1999.
9 Exclusive of Konsolidacní banka.foreign banks has however other advantages. In the countries considered here
the main motivation for choosing privatization by foreign investors was
probably the expected transfer of know-how in conducting banking business.
This strategy makes sense given the need and the pressure to improve the
screening and monitoring technology as well as managerial skills swiftly.
Figure 1 shows the share of foreign ownership in the banking sector’s equity
at the end of 1999. In Poland, this share increased slightly to 53.8% (from
53.1%) at the end of 2000. However, it has to be stressed that this foreign
equity ownership implied the effective foreign majority control of an even
larger share of Polish banks; these banks accounted for 71.7% of the sector’s
equity and 69.6% of the sector’s assets at the end of 2000. The high degree of
foreign ownership resulted not only from privatization transactions, but also
from (the growth of) newly founded banks.
Figure 1
2.2 Size and Concentration of the Banking Sector
The size of the CEEC-3 banking sectors (excluding the central banks) in
terms of absolute volume as well as in relation to GDP is relatively small, as
Figure 2 shows. At the end of 2000, credit institutions’ total assets amounted
to just EUR 117.4 billion (65.6% of GDP) in Poland, a country with
a population of 38 million. With a level of 142.5% of GDP, banking assets in
the Czech Republic stand out in comparison to the peer group. By
16 The Banking Systemcomparison, total banking assets amounted to EUR 562.7 billion in Austria
(273% of GDP) at the end of 2000.
Figure 2
The concentration in CEE banking sectors is slightly below the EU average.
However, in the Czech Republic, the market share of the four largest credit
institutions in 2000 was above the EU average of a 60% market share of the
five largest banks in 1999. Considering that banking sectors in the smaller EU
countries (which are probably a better benchmark for comparisons than the
EU average) tend to be more concentrated, CEE banking sectors appear even
less strongly concentrated at present. However, a number of mergers have
taken place recently, and this trend is likely to continue.
The Banking System 17Figure 3
2.3 Structure of Lending and Deposits
The change in the structure of the stock of domestic credit extended by the
banking system, i.e. the banking sector and the central bank, (see Table 2) is
characterized by a strong cutback of central bank lending to the government
in Poland and Hungary. In the Czech Republic, central bank credit to the
general government has been zero since 1996, down from around 4% of GDP
in 1993.
After having risen from 1992 to 1995, the stock of commercial banks’ lending
to government relative to GDP declined in Poland from 1996 and in Hungary
from 1997 onward because the countries pursued cautious fiscal policies and
because the role of direct financial intermediation between nonbanks and the
government became more important (see also section 4.2.2).
This development helped boost the stock of domestic credit to the corporate
sector relative to GDPin Poland and Hungary to a level of above 20% of GDP
in the year 2000 after it had fallen from the beginning of the 1990s up to 1995
in Poland and 1996 in Hungary. However, in Hungary, the high initial level of
1990-92 (27.0% of GDP) has not yet been reached again, and the increase of
corporate lending fell far short of compensating for the decline of net credit
extended to the public sector by the banking system (central bank and
commercial banks), implying a substantial decrease in total domestic credit.
18 The Banking SystemOn the other hand, the extraordinarily high level of credit to the corporate sector
in the Czech Republic fell significantly both in absolute terms and relative to
GDP from 1997 (57.3%) to 2000 (47.1%).
10 This reduction was caused by the
structural bad-loan problem and by the even more restrictive turn in monetary
policy in 1997-98. Lower bank lending contributed to the recession in 1998-99,
which in turn reinforced the decline in lending. The significant amount of
nonperforming loans led to restrictive new lending by the banks. Finally,
a substantial part of these nonperforming loans were transferred to the state-
owned consolidation bank in 1998 and, above all, in 1999 and 2000, so that they
no longer showed up in domestic credit. However, even after adjusting for this
statistical change, the stock of domestic credit to the corporate sector seems to
have fallen from 1997 (57.3% of GDP) to 2000 (55.0% of GDP).
A comparison of lending to households between those countries reveals
a quite divergent pattern. While lending to households in relation to GDProse
continuously in Poland from 1994 to 2000, it augmented in Hungary and in
the Czech Republic only from 1998 or 1999, respectively, after it had fallen
substantially since 1994.
Table  2: Stock of Domestic Credit of the Banking System (Including Foreign
Exchange-Denominated Credit)
average, in % of GDP
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 2000
corrected
Total 32.3 36.0 53.6 36.8 64.7 58.0 65.8
Net credit to public sector 15.7 8.4 28.8 10.1 1.0 4.7 4.7
Credit to OFIs 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Credit to corporate sector 15.4 20.3 18.9 22.2 55.2 47.1 55.0
Credit to households 1.2 6.1 5.9 3.4 8.6 6.2 6.2
Note:
OFIs: other financial institutions than deposit money banks.
Hungary: The external debt for the government channeled through the central bank is excluded
from net credit to the public sector and thus from total domestic credit, as the external debt of
the government is not included for the other countries, either. Including this credit raises the
corresponding figures by 32.4 percentage points in 1994 and by 12.9 percentage points in
2000.
Czech Republic: The values shown in the column “2000 corrected” indicate the size of the
credit stock that would have been reached if there had not been transfers of nonperforming
loans to the state-owned Konsolidacna banka in 1998 to 2000.
Source: national central banks, WIIW, OeNB.
The Banking System 19The ratio of resident commercial banks’ new net lending to the corporate
sector (i.e. the change in the stock of credit to the corporate sector) to total
gross fixed capital investment has fallen since the early 1990s, when it
amounted to between 25% and 35%. In Hungary, the ratio averaged 30.7% in
1990-91. While the increase in the stock of credit to the corporate sector was
sufficient to raise the ratio of this credit stock to gross domestic product (and
to gross fixed capital investment) from 1996-97 to 2000 in Poland and
Hungary, it was not sizeable enough to imply a constant or even rising ratio
of this increase to gross fixed capital investment in Hungary and, in particular,
in Poland. In the years 1999-2000, the average ratio was highest in Hungary
(18.9%), while it was even negative in the Czech Republic as Table 3
indicates. 
11 The general decline in this financing ratio is probably attributable
to not just one, but several partly interrelated factors: (1) the improved self-
financing capacity of companies, (2) resident commercial banks’ improved
lending control and risk assessment coupled with tighter prudential
regulations, (3) an insufficient increase in resident banks’lending capacity, 
12
and (4) high real lending rates. The parallel considerable increase in
nonresident banks’ cross-border lending indicates that lending by resident
(domestically or foreign-owned) commercial banks did not sufficiently meet
the growing investment needs of an economy striving to catch up with the
European Union. In addition, it has to be noted that an increasing part of gross
fixed capital investment was financed by intercompany loans extended by the
foreign parent company. To some extent, the different development of
domestic lending and foreign (cross-border) credit can be explained by the
fact that sometimes domestic foreign-owned banks act not so much as
a lender themselves, but as a “broker” for credits to companies extended by
their foreign parent banks, in particular in case of large credit volumes.
20 The Banking System
10 The extraordinarily high level of domestic credit to the corporate sector in the Czech
Republic mainly constitutes a country-specific legacy of the communist era. Moreover, some
specific macroeconomic features of the early phase of transition played a role. In particular, the
relatively low initial boost in inflation upon transition implied that the erosion of money was
only moderate. With the differences between the countries being so strong, it seems to be more
fitting to look at the development of credit aggregates than at their levels.
11 While the change in the stock of credit generally shows the difference between the flows
of new lending and repayment, it may also reflect extraordinary changes. Thus, the negative
value in the Czech Republic on average in the years 1999 and 2000, reflect – inter alia – the
transfer of nonperforming loans from the commercial banks to the state-owned consolidation
banks. However, even after adjusting for this statistical change, the ratio of the increase in the
stock of domestic credit to the corporate sector to gross fixed capital investment seems to have
fallen significantly in the second half of the nineties.
12 In particular, the traditionally large banks do not seem to have improved the efficiency
of their internal organization of credit allocation enough, resulting at times in disproportionate
credit restrictions.Table 3: Credit to the Corporate Sector by the Banking System
change in % of gross fixed capital investment
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1994 1998 2000 1994 1998 2000 1994 1998 2000 1998 2000
corrected
25.6 18.7 11.4 3.6 19.7 18.9 30.0 10.0 –8.6 10.7 5.2
Note:
1994 denotes average of 1992-94, 1998 denotes average of 1996-98 and 2000 denotes average
of 1999-2000.
Hungary: The low level in 1994 is mainly due to a negative ratio of –11.1% in 1992. The
average ratio for the years 1993-94 was 10.9%.
Czech Republic: The values shown in the columns “1998 and 2000 corrected” indicate the size
of the change in credit that would have been reached if there had not been transfers of
nonperforming loans to the state-owned Konsolidacna banka in 1998 to 2000.
Source: national central banks, WIIW, OeNB.
For several reasons, it is interesting to take a look at the currency breakdown
of domestic credit. The following table shows the share of the corporate
sector’s credit stock denominated in foreign currency and extended by the
domestic banking system in percent of the total stock of credit to the corporate
sector by the domestic banking system. This share significantly rose from
1994 to 2000, reaching almost 40% in Hungary and 25% in Poland (see
Table 4).
To assess the impact exchange rate movements may have on the corporate
sector, it is probably better to look at the net position, which is derived by
subtracting the corporate sector’s deposits denominated in foreign currency
from its foreign exchange credit. It follows that the share of corporate sector
credit denominated in foreign currency that was not covered by (on-balance)
foreign exchange claims against the domestic banking system amounted to
about 30% in Hungary and 17% in Poland in the year 2000. However, when
drawing conclusions about the impact of exchange rate movements on the
corporate sector, some caveats have to be borne in mind. First, the calculation
of the net positions offsets credits and deposits regardless of possible
differences in their currency of denomination. Moreover, Table 4 does not
incorporate off-balance-sheet positions.
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Banking System
in % of total credit (including foreign exchange credit), extended to the corporate
sector by the domestic banking system, end of period:
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
Gross position 10.3 23.7 11.8 38.0 6.0 18.5
Net position 7.3 17.2 –0.9 29.9 3.4 10.1
Note:
The gross position comprises credit denominated in foreign currency.
The net position comprises credit minus deposits denominated in foreign currency.
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
Taking this approach one step further, the next table includes the foreign debt
liabilities of the corporate sector. When taking into account the foreign
exchange-denominated deposits held by the corporate sector with the
domestic banking system as well as the foreign assets held by the corporate
sector, the corporate sector’s net foreign exchange position in percent of the
total credit received from the domestic banking system and foreign creditors
amounted to about 49% in Poland, 43% in Hungary and 29% in the Czech
Republic (see Table 5).
Table 5: The Corporate Sector’s Foreign Exchange Position against the Domestic
Banking System and Nonresidents
in % of total credit (including foreign exchange credit), extended to the corporate
sector by the domestic banking system and foreign creditors, end of period:
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1995 1997 2000 1995 1997 2000 1997 2000
Gross 30.8 42.2 57.3 55.5 57.7 67.2 40.2 45.9
Net 21.0 32.7 48.6 30.2 42.9 43.2 25.8 28.9
Note:
The gross position comprises credit denominated in foreign currency.
The net position comprises credit denominated in foreign currency minus both the foreign
currency-denominated deposits with the domestic banking system and the corporate sector’s
foreign assets.
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
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the corporate sector relative to GDP is significantly higher in the Czech
Republic. Thus, relating the net foreign exchange position to GDPleads to the
result that at the end of 2000 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had
about the same ratio, 20%. In the Czech Republic, the net foreign exchange
position relative to GDP has been roughly unchanged since 1997, while it has
increased in Hungary (from 15%) and more than doubled in Poland
(from 9%).
It seems that financial conditions for the corporate sector are decisively
determined by the exchange rate. This fact must not be overlooked when
investigating the monetary transmission channels in the Central and Eastern
European countries.
For exporters who generate revenues in foreign currency, foreign
currency-denominated debt may serve as a hedging tool. Similarly, the
increasing use of foreign currency-denominated debt is a sign of increasing
financial integration with the EU, complementary to the real integration in
terms of foreign trade. On the other hand, the marked increase in foreign
currency-denominated credit probably also reflects expectations of
enterprises of a continued future (trend) real appreciation and high real
lending rates for domestic currency-denominated credit (in particular if
measured against the producer price index of manufacturing).
Downward corrections of the exchange rate would affect the costs of debt
servicing by enterprises that have incurred unhedged foreign
currency-denominated debt. If such enterprises did not benefit from the
downward correction on their revenue side (e.g. because they are mainly
oriented to the domestic market), their overall financial situation would
suffer.
Turning from banks’ assets to banks’ liabilities, deposits are mostly held in
domestic currency. The share of foreign currency-denominated deposits
shows a declining trend in the long term, reflecting growing trust in the local
currency and continuous expectations of future real appreciation and
relatively high real interest rates. Temporary increases in the share of foreign
currency-denominated deposits seem to have been connected with times of
economic turbulence (e.g. in Hungary in 1995 and in the Czech Republic in
1997).
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in % of money supply including foreign exchange deposits, end of period:
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
28.5 14.6 18.4 16.9 7.0 10.6
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
One important element of financial stability is to avoid a too large foreign
currency mismatch in the banking sector. The following table (Table 7)
summarizes the net foreign assets of the commercial banks as well as the net
foreign exchange position of the commercial banks against domestic
nonbanks (enterprises, households as well as the general government). It
should be noted that Table 7 does not incorporate off-balance-sheet positions.
Table 7: Commercial Banks’ Net Foreign Assets and their Net Foreign Exchange
Position against Domestic Nonbanks
in % of GDP, end of period:
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
Domestic net FX position –2.1 0.4 –6.6 4.5 n/a 0.4
Net foreign assets (NFA) 6.7 2.9 –2.6 –6.9 2.4 16.3
Note: The domestic net foreign exchange position includes holdings of externally issued
foreign currency-denominated bonds of the national government (e.g. Polish commercial
banks’ holdings of Polish Brady bonds).
Source: national central banks, WIIW, OeNB.
According to the table above (Table 7), the foreign exchange exposure of the
Hungarian banking sector seems to have improved in recent years.
13 This
primarily reflects increased domestic foreign exchange-denominated lending
against a smaller decrease of foreign exchange-denominated deposits
accepted from nonbanks. In addition, it can be assumed that a significant part
of the foreign liabilities constitute liabilities to foreign parent banks.
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13 The caveats mentioned above also apply in this case.2.4 Banking Sector Efficiency and Profitability
In addition to taxes and transaction costs borne directly by savers and
investors, bank interest spreads drive a wedge between returns to savers and
financing costs for investors and thus affect the equilibrium between the
supply of deposits and the demand for loans. Therefore, interest spreads may
be interpreted as an indicator of banking sector efficiency if the impact of
differences in the level of minimum reserve requirements on the interest
spread is adequately taken into account.
Interest spreads are also a major determinant of banking sector profitability.
In order to enable banks to take risks and to promote a stable and sustainable
expansion of the banking sector, banking operations have to be sufficiently
profitable. It has long been recognized in the finance literature that there
might be a certain tension between increased competition and financial
stability (see Allan and Gale, 2000). Low margins may enhance risk-shifting
incentives. To reap the full benefits of increased competition and at the same
time preserve a reasonable degree of financial stability appropriate
supervision and banking regulation might be necessary.
Looking at interest rate margins we see that in comparison with other catching-
up economies, the interest rate spread between lending and deposit rates (IS) is
rather low in the three Central European economies covered in this study.
According to the World Bank’s (2001) development indicators, in 1999 the
spread between lending and deposit rates was lower only in 20 emerging market
economies (of a total of 127 emerging market economies) than the CEEC-3
average of 4.4 percentage points. The Czech Republic’s interest rate spread of
3.1 percentage points (see Table 10) was even comparable with that of the most
developed industrial countries (which generally exhibit low spreads). 
14 Thus,
financial intermediation is provided at comparatively low costs for the real
sector in the CEEC-3. However, in real terms returns to savers and financing
costs for investments are affected by the considerable difference between
consumer and producer price inflation in the CEEC-3. As year-on-year changes
in the CPI (more relevant for savings) normally exceed changes in the PPI of
industrial producers (more relevant for investment) in the CEEC-3, real returns
for savers fall and real financing costs for industrial producers rise accordingly.
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14 Moreover, when comparing the interest spread in the CEEC-3 with that in the most
developed industrial countries, it has to be taken into account that some of the CEEC-3, in
particular Poland and Hungary, had far higher minimum reserve requirements than the most
developed industrial countries at least up to 1999.On the downside, banking sector profitability in the CEEC-3 (with the
exception of Poland) was clearly inadequate in recent years. In 1998-99 the
banking sector even suffered losses in the Czech Republic. By way of
comparison, the banking industry’s return on equity (ROE) in the EU was
11.7% in 1999. Figures for 2000 show a clear improvement in banking
profitability, with the ROE being positive in real terms in all three countries.
Table 8: Return on Equity (ROE)
1997 1998 1999 2000
Poland 22.7% 8.1% 11.7% 13.9%
Czech Republic –2.9% –5.2% –4.3% 12.0%
Hungary 11.9% 7.5% 3.6% 10.9%
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
With a share of between 60.6% and 66.5% of gross income in 2000, net
interest income is more important for CEEC-3 banks’bottom line than for that
of banks in the EU, where this share amounted to only 54% in 1999.
Table 9: Net Interest Income / Gross Income
1997 1998 1999 2000
Poland 72.9% 70.3% 63.7% 61.7%
Czech Republic 45.4% 67.7% 62.7% 66.5%
Hungary 67.8% 71.9% 88.8% 60.6%
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
Obviously, the development of net interest income is strongly influenced by
the development of spreads between contractual rates charged for loans and
paid for deposits (IS), but for the analysis of profitability of the intermediary
function of banks, defaults should be taken into consideration as well.
To address this issue, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) propose the use of
net interest margins (NIM). The NIM is defined as the ratio of net interest
income to average banking assets. Although the IS and the NIM will normally
differ, 
15 the difference between the two measures may provide insights into
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15 Especially over time, differences between the two measures are likely to arise: Loan
defaults, which affect the net interest margin by reducing the share of interest-bearing assets in
bank assets, will mostly occur with a time lag in comparison with the specific date for which
the spread between lending and deposit rates was calculated.the extent to which the spread between lending and deposit rates is eroded by
loan defaults. Assuming an equal IS, the NIM should be lower for a bank with
a larger share of non-interest-bearing assets (such as nonperforming loans), as
these assets do not deliver the contractual interest rate and thus do not
contribute to net interest income but are still included in banking assets.
Table 10: Lending Rate minus Deposit Rate to Nonbanks
difference (in %-points) of the annual average of rates in % p.a.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Poland 10.9 11.0 8.5 7.3 7.2 6.9 6.7
Czech Republic 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.8 2.3 3.1 2.9
Hungary 7.1 6.5 5.1 3.3 4.2 4.5 3.9
Note: Deposit rates are rates on household deposits excluding demand deposits.
Including demand deposits would increase these spreads by about 1 percentage point in all the
countries in the year 2000.
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
Table 11: Net Interest Margin
net interest income in % of average banking assets
1997 1998 1999 2000
Poland 4.8% 4.6% 4.0% 4.2%
Czech Republic 1.8% 2.9% 2.3% 2.0%
Hungary 3.8% 4.3% 4.0% 3.9%
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
As expected, Hungary, which has low burdens of nonperforming loans, shows
very small deviations between the IS and the NIM. In 1997 and 1998 the NIM
even exceeds the IS in Hungary, which is probably attributable to the fact that
revenues from currency forward transactions are in part registered as interest
revenues while expenses related to these transactions are accounted for in
other positions.
16 Contrary to expectations, there were small deviations in the
Czech Republic as well, despite a burden of nonperforming loans that was by
far higher than in Hungary.
In the Czech Republic, both measures show that the difference between
deposit and lending rates was too low to provide sufficient compensation for
the exercise of the intermediary function.
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16 See National Bank of Hungary (1999b).Figure 4 below shows the size of nonperforming loans relative to total assets
of the banking sector (excluding the central bank). The current level of
nonperforming loans in the CEEC-3 still seems to be fairly high, in particular
in the Czech Republic and in Poland. This has to be explained not only by the
legacy of the past, but also by the impact of recession (in the Czech Republic)
or a sharp slowdown of economic growth (in Poland). For instance, the share
of nonperforming loans increased in recent years in Poland. (Further insight
into the issue of nonperforming loans could be gained by splitting them into
the sub-categories of substandard, doubtful and loss loans as well as by taking
into account accumulated loan provisions and collateral values.)
Figure 4
The structure of expenses (in relation to gross income) of CEEC-3 banks is
characterized by higher provisioning, but lower general operating expenses
than of EU banks. In 1999, net provisioning charges amounted to 10% of
gross income, while general operating expenses stood at 68% of gross income
in the EU. However, general operating expenses in the CEEC-3 have
28 The Banking Systemincreased strongly in recent years, with above-average growth rates for
depreciation (resulting mainly from large investments in IT).
Table 12: Net Provisions/Gross Income
1997 1998 1999 2000
Poland 4.4% 9.9% 14.3% 15.8%
Czech Republic 34.0% 14.6% 0.1% –46.7%
Hungary –1.4% 8.1% –1.1% –0.2%
Note: 
The transfer of bad loans in the Czech Republic led to a large release of provisions in 2000.
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
Table 13: Operating Expenses/Gross Income
1997 1998 1999 2000
Poland 55.6% 63.0% 65.2% 62.9%
Czech Republic 48.6% 49.2% 56.6% 65.7%
Hungary 54.5% 59.6% 87.0% 57.9%
Source: national central banks, OeNB.
However, aggregate banking sector figures hide considerable differences in
profitability within the sector. The Hungarian National Bank (2000a) shows
these differences explicitly by defining two distinct groups of banks. The
situation in the Czech Republic where some successful banks exist in parallel
with the problem-ridden state-owned banks, seems to be similar. According to
the National Bank of Hungary (2000a), early foreign entrants and quickly
restructured domestic banks belong to the most profitable entities.
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Our discussion of the capital market concentrates on stock and bond markets.
Apart from possible contributions to the external funding of companies, stock
markets can provide risk-sharing opportunities and bond markets can play
a role in the financing of the public sector. Our focus is on both equity
markets and markets for debt securities denominated in local currency (LCY).
Listings on foreign stock exchanges are touched upon only briefly, while
international bond issues are not covered at all in this section.
3.1 The Establishment of Capital Markets
3.1.1 Establishment of Equity Markets
The development of equity markets in the CEEC-3 was driven mainly by the
privatization process. In terms of market capitalization, equity markets
initially developed most rapidly in countries where mass privatization
schemes were initiated. For the countries considered in this study this was
particularly true for the Czech Republic. Market infrastructure and regulation
was often put in place after the establishment of a rudimentary market. In
contrast, in Poland and Hungary infrastructure and an extensive regulatory
framework were established first, and new listings gradually entered the
market. Over the horizon of the last decade the latter approach proved more
successful, which is reflected in the higher liquidity and better performance
of stock indices in Hungary and Poland. The Czech equity markets exhibit
a more fragmented structure with a comparatively large number of small
companies with low liquidity. Besides, Hungarian and Polish companies
tended to be at a more advanced stage of restructuring than their peers in the
other countries when they were listed, which had a positive impact on the
development of the respective stock prices.
3.1.2 Establishment of Markets for Debt Securities Denominated in Local
Currency
The emergence of these markets was linked mainly to the management of
public debt and the process of macroeconomic stabilization. The
securitization of loans to the central government denominated in local
currency went in parallel to the declining importance of the central bank as
a creditor to the public sector. Within the market for central government debt
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placed and publicly issued securities, the latter comprising both marketable
securities (T-bills, T-bonds) and nonmarketable ones (retail securities).
Private placements were made mainly in the first half of the 1990s and were
linked to (1) the recapitalization of commercial banks, (2) the securitization
of central bank loans denominated in local currency to the central
government, and (3) the conversion of foreign currency-denominated
government bonds held by the central bank into local currency-denominated
ones. Initially, privately placed bonds were mostly nonmarketable; in the
meantime, most of them have been transformed into marketable bonds.
3.2 Size and Structure of Securities Markets
The ranking of the CEEC-3 countries by the total capitalization of their
equity markets differs when measured in absolute or relative terms. At the end
of 2000, Poland had the highest total market capitalization in absolute terms
(USD 31.4 billion), while Hungary clearly exhibited the highest total market
capitalization in relation to GDP (25.9%) as Table 14 shows.
In the analysis of equity market capitalization, it has to be stressed that total
market capitalization includes the total equity capital of all listed companies,
thus including strategic holdings. It is useful to analyze free-float market
capitalization (i.e. all portfolio holdings) as well. Unfortunately, such figures
are available for the year-end 1998 only. Hungary had the highest volume of
free-float market capitalization with USD 7.5 billion and 15.7% of GDP
(Benoit, Demel, Reininger, 2001). For comparison, the total market
capitalization of the Hungarian equity market amounted to 29.5% of GDP at
the end of 1998.
Compared to the equity markets of most developed market economies, even
the Hungarian equity market is still small in relation to the size of the
economy (U.S.A.: 152.7% of GDP; Germany: 63.1%, end-2000
17) and even
more so in absolute terms.
Almost all the benchmark equity indices calculated by the stock exchanges
concentrate on the blue-chip companies of the main market segments. Within
these benchmark indices, the five highest capitalized shares have
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Table 14: Market Capitalization
end of period:a cumulative weight of (far) more than 50%.
18 Minimum listing requirements
of CEE stock exchanges are quite different, the Budapest Stock Exchange
being the most restrictive, followed by Warsaw (see Benoit, Demel,
Reininger, 2001).
The market capitalization (at face value) of debt securities denominated in
local currency (LCY) in absolute U.S. dollar terms largely mirrored the
absolute size of the total economy at the end of 2000 (e.g. USD 34.3 billion
for Poland) as Table 14 shows.
However, the Hungarian market for debt securities is the largest one, both
with and without privately placed securities, if measured by market
capitalization (at face value) relative to GDP. It is followed by the Czech
Republic and Poland, which have about the same market size.
The smaller size of markets for debt securities denominated in local currency
(relative to GDP) in the CEEC-3 in comparison with the most developed
market economies is attributable to the lower public debt burden in the
CEEC-3 and to the higher (inherited) share of foreign currency-denominated
debt in total public debt.
Thus, the Hungarian capital markets – both the equity market and the market
for debt securities denominated in local currency – have the biggest weight
within the whole national economy among the CEEC-3.
The  total equity market capitalization was smaller than the market
capitalization of debt securities denominated in local currency in Poland and
Hungary at year-end 2000. However, it was bigger than the market
capitalization of publicly issued debt securities (excluding retail securities) in
all countries. On the other hand, the free-float equity market capitalization
was probably by far lower than the market capitalization of publicly issued
debt securities (excluding retail securities) in all countries.
Concerning the issuer structure of the market for debt securities in local
currency, central government debt securities are predominant in each of the
CEEC-3. It is only in the Czech Republic that debt securities of other issuers
play a significant role compared to central government securities. In this
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18 These indices are mostly market capitalization-weighted price indices, only the Budapest
index (BUX) is a total return index (Benoit, Demel, Reininger, 2001).country, the market capitalization of (mostly) long-term debt securities of
other issuers even exceeded the market capitalization of long-term central
government debt securities at the end of 2000. However, it is worth
mentioning that in Poland the market for privately placed corporate debt
securities, above all short-term commercial paper, grew dynamically from
1997 to 2000. Interestingly, companies are the largest group of investors in
these securities, accounting for 39% of the nominal debt value in October
2000, followed by banks with 36% and insurance companies with 10% (see
CERA, 2001).
Looking at the maturity structure of all publicly issued debt securities (of the
central government and other issuers), the volume of long-term paper was
clearly larger than that of short-term paper in all countries at the end of 2000,
reflecting the success of financial stabilization and disinflation. Also within
the outstanding publicly issued debt securities of the central government only,
long-term instruments were predominant in all countries, with the Czech
Republic being the notable exception. Moreover, in the Czech Republic the
outstanding volume of T-bills increased from 1997 to 2000, while it markedly
decreased in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, Poland, Hungary as
well as the Czech Republic already have fixed-rate government bonds with
a 10-year maturity or, in the Czech Republic, even with a 15-year maturity.
Another sign of the advances of the bond markets, in particular in Poland and
Hungary, is the growing share of fixed-rate government bonds, while in the
Czech Republic government bonds are traditionally fixed-rate bonds. In
Poland, the share of fixed-rate bonds’ face value in the nominal value of all
publicly issued central government bonds denominated in local currency
(excluding retail securities) grew from 59% at the end of 1997 to 76% at the
end of 2000. In Hungary, the share of fixed-rate bonds’ face value in the
nominal value of all (publicly issued and privately placed) central
government bonds denominated in local currency grew from 47% at the end
of 1997 to 65% at the end of 2000.
3.3 Liquidity of Securities Markets
Poland stood out with the highest equity turnover in absolute U.S. dollar terms
in 2000, after turnover had more than doubled from 1998 to 2000. In contrast,
equity turnover only moderately increased in the Czech Republic and even
declined in Hungary (from USD 16 billion in 1998). However, relative to
nominal GDP, the top position of Hungary in terms of equity market turnover
was still pronounced in 2000 at 26.2% of GDP (see Table 15).
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Poland Hungary Czech Republic
2000 2000 2000
in USD million
Equity markets 19,452 12,106 6,845
Debt securities in local currency 167,541 70,840 66,931
thereof: central government 167,541 70,669 50,651
thereof: T-bills 97,381 19,120 42,088
thereof: T-bonds 70,160 51,550 8,564
thereof: other issuers 0 170 16,279
in % of GDP
Equity markets 12.2 26.2 13.8
Debt securities in local currency 105.5 153.6 135.2
thereof: central government 105.5 153.2 102.3
thereof: T-bills 61.3 41.4 85.0
thereof: T-bonds 44.2 111.8 17.3
thereof: other issuers 0.0 0.4 32.9
Notes:
Turnover is single counted.
No data on turnover of privately placed central government debt securities are avaliable.
T-bills: The high turnover in T-bills is to a significant extent caused by sell and buy-back
operations. This explains over 75% of the T-bill turnover in Poland, for instance.
Source: Central European Rating Agency – CERA S.A., national ministries of finance, national
stock exchanges, WIIW, OeNB.
Within the equity markets, trading of shares takes place primarily on the main
market segment of the stock exchange, where the most liquid blue-chip
companies are listed. The share of the main market segment in total turnover
typically amounts to more than 80%.
Again, Poland had the highest turnover of debt securities in local currency in
absolute terms in 2000 (USD 167.5 billion). And again, Hungary had by far
the highest turnover in relative terms, with a level of 154% of GDP. The
Czech Republic came second. From 1999 to 2000, the turnover of debt
securities in local currency rose by more than 30% in Poland, while it fell by
more than 20% in Hungary and in the Czech Republic.
As to the maturity structure, the turnover in T-bills was lower than the
turnover in T-bonds only in Hungary. Moreover, in Hungary the turnover in
36 The Capital MarketT-bills (in percent of GDP) was even lower than in Poland and in the Czech
Republic, while the turnover in T-bonds (in percent of GDP) was far higher.
This exceptional situation in Hungary can probably be explained by the
following facts: (1) unlike in Poland and the Czech Republic, the Hungarian
T-bill market was not open to foreign investors before June 2001, while the
T-bond market was accessible to them, (2) in general, the T-bond market in
Hungary already constitutes an institutionally more developed alternative for
domestic investors than that in other countries of the CEEC-3. However, it is
noteworthy that in Poland bond market turnover developed particularly well
recently, more than doubling from 1999 to 2000.
Relating secondary market turnover to year-average market capitalization
gives a measure of the liquidity of the capital markets. With foreign trading
activity strong, the Hungarian equity market was clearly the most liquid
market if measured by the turnover ratio based on total market capitalization.
The liquidity of the Hungarian equity market was even comparable to that of
the equity markets in the most developed market economies. With total equity
turnover amounting to 110% of market capitalization in 1998 and 85% in
2000, the Hungarian equity market reached the liquidity levels of the U.S.
equity market (106% in 1999).
Table 16: Market liquidity
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
2000 2000 2000
Turnover in % of year-average market capitalization
Equity markets 63.6 85.3 54.7
Debt securities in local currency 539.9 447.5 657.5
thereof: central government 599.3 452.6 786.1
thereof: T-bills 1601.4 615.3 1053.8
thereof: T-bonds 441.5 691.8 349.6
thereof: other issuers 0.0 78.9 435.7
Notes:
The liquidity ratios are based on single counted turnover.
For Poland and Hungary, the turnover in privately placed local currency-denominated debt
securities of the central government was assumed to be zero for the purpose of calculating
liquidity ratios of all central government debt instruments and of all debt securities in local
currency.
Source: Central European Rating Agency – CERA S.A., national ministries of finance, national
stock exchanges, WIIW, OeNB.
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in both the short-term and the long-term debt securities market than in the
equity market.
Within the debt securities market, the market for central government
securities was far more liquid than that for securities of other issuers in 2000.
Within the market for central government securities, the T-bill market was
significantly more liquid than the T-bond market in Poland and the Czech
Republic, but not so in Hungary (see the above explanation on the turnover of
T-bills in Hungary). In the Czech Republic, the market for T-bonds alone was
even less liquid than that for securities of other issuers in 2000.
3.4 Foreign Participation in the Equity Markets
The share of the stock of foreign portfolio investment in  total market
capitalization at the end of 2000 was between 18.6% and 26.1% in Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic as Table 17 shows.
Table 17: Market Participants
stock of foreign portfolio equity investment in % of total market capitalization
end of period:
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1997 2000 1997 2000 1997 2000
21.5 18.6 17.0 25.0 21.2 26.1
Note:
The stock of foreign portfolio equity investment is related to total market capitalization and not
only to the outstanding portfolio equity capital (“free-float” market capitalization).
Source: national central banks, national stock exchanges, OeNB.
At first glance, these shares do not seem to be particularly high. However, it
has to be stressed again that total market capitalization includes all strategic
stakes as well. Thus, the implied share of foreign portfolio holdings in total
portfolio market capitalization (free-float market capitalization) is
significantly higher.
Unfortunately, a breakdown of the ownership structure of the total capital of
all the listed companies exists only for Hungary. In this country, the share of
total foreign investment in the listed companies’ equity, comprising both
direct and portfolio investment, was about 70.7% at the end of 2000. The
share of the government amounted to 8.3%.
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households, companies, institutional investors and credit institutions) is
regarded as portfolio investment in the sense of nonstrategic holdings, foreign
portfolio investors held about 55% of total portfolio investment in the
Hungarian equity market at the end of 2000, although their share in total
market capitalization was no more than 25%.
Table 18: Ownership Structure of Companies Listed on the Domestic Stock Exchange
(share in total, in %)
Hungary
1997 1999 2000
Total equity capital outstanding 100.0 100.0 100.0
All domestic investors 31.7 20.8 29.3
Government 14.2 7.1 8.3
Local government 1.0 0.8 0.7
Other general government 13.2 6.3 7.5
Private non-financial sector 13.0 9.9 14.9
Households 9.4 5.9 8.0
Nonprofit institutions 0.0 0.2 0.1
Nonfinancial companies 3.5 3.9 6.7
Institutional investors 3.7 3.3 4.9
Investment funds 0.9 0.5 1.1
Insurance companies, pension funds 1.1 1.3 2.6
Other financial corporations 1.7 1.5 1.2
Credit institutions 0.7 0.6 1.2
All foreign investors 68.3 79.2 70.7
Source: National Bank of Hungary, OeNB.
Table 19 shows minimumsharesof foreign buying or selling in percent of total
equity market turnover. These values are derived by calculating the share of
either total buying or total selling (whichever was higher) by foreign portfolio
equity investors (according to balance of payments statistics) in total secondary
market turnover for any given year. As the calculated share includes only either
total buying or, alternatively, total selling by foreign investors, it does not
include the opposite transaction (i.e. either selling or, alternatively, buying) by
foreign investors with domestic investors (i.e. selling to or buying from
domestic investors). Therefore, it has to be stressed that the actual shares of
foreign buying or selling very probably exceed these minimum levels by far.
The Capital Market 39(However, it is not possible to simply add the figures of buying and selling and
relate that sum to total market turnover, as such a calculation would involve
a significant amount of double counting which might even lead to ratios
above 100%.) Based on these minimum shares of foreign portfolio investors’
activity in the total turnover of the equity market, we may estimate the actual
shares of foreign portfolio investors in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic
as clearly above 50%, perhaps about 60% to 75%.
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Table 19: Foreign Share of Equity Market Turnover
minimum share of foreign buying or selling in % of total equity market turnover
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1996-97 1999-00 1996-97 1999-00 1996-97 1999-00
33.5 56.4 68.1 39.3 37.0 50.7
Note:
1996-97 = average share in the years 1996 and 1997.
1999-00 = average share in the years 1999 and 2000.
Source: national central banks, national stock exchanges, OeNB.
In addition, trading in CEEC-3 equities takes place not only on the local stock
exchanges, but also on foreign stock exchanges, either in the form of ordinary
shares or mostly in the form of depositary receipts (DRs). Because of their
specific advantages for both CEE companies and investors, trading in DRs
has gained considerable importance. For CEE companies, DRs offer the
advantage of enhancing the liquidity of their shares, widening their investor
base as well as improving their corporate image. As DRs are denominated in
U.S. dollars and traded on an international exchange, their advantages for
institutional investors are related to their better liquidity, the absence of
conversion costs and to familiar market practices (see Benoit, Schantl,
Weyringer, 2001). Assessing trading in CEEC-3 equities on both local and
foreign stock exchanges, it is fair to state that trading in these equities is
overwhelmingly done by foreign portfolio investors, reflecting the high
degree of integration of CEEC-3 capital markets in international markets.
Moreover, at least in the case of Hungary, the majority of the equity of listed
companies is owned by foreign portfolio or foreign strategic investors.
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19 The breakdown for the turnover (including sell and buy-back operations) in local
currency-denominated central government bonds by market participants for the year 2000 in
Hungary shows the share of foreign investors as 8.5%, far behind the shares of credit institutions
(42%), institutional investors (21%) and companies (11.5%) (Hungarian State Treasury, 2001).4 The Structure of Funding
4.1 Funding of the Private Sector
4.1.1 International Comparison of the Private Sector’s Funding Sources
The stock of domestic credit to the private nonfinancial sector provided by
resident banks was markedly lower in the CEEC-3 at 25.6% to 53.3% of GDP
on average in 2000 than in Portugal and Spain, the Southern European
catching-up economies within the EU. In these two countries, this ratio was
84.1% and 65.1%, respectively, of GDP on average in 1998, the year before
entering the euro area (see Table 20).
Moreover, among the CEEC-3, the Czech Republic exhibited by far the highest
level at 53.3% of GDP. Its relatively high levels can be explained mainly by
historical developments (see section 2.3). In addition, it has to be stressed that
according to the national banking supervision reports, classified loans (i.e.
watch loans and nonperforming loans) amounted to 12.8% of GDP in the
Czech Republic (despite the reduction due to transfers of nonperforming loans
to the state-owned consolidation bank, which simultaneously decreased the
outstanding stock of domestic credit; see also section 2.3), as against 5.3% of
GDPin Hungary and 3.4% of GDPin Poland at mid-year 2000. If we take into
account the accumulated loan provisions at the time, the remaining net volume
of classified loans was 8.0% of GDPin the Czech Republic, 4.2% in Hungary
and 2.1% in Poland. These classified loans included as the lowest-ranked
category so-called bad loans, or loss loans, which amounted to a gross volume
(i.e. before the deduction of provisions) of 4.5% of GDPin the Czech Republic,
0.6% in Hungary and 1.2% in Poland (see also section 2.4). 
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Furthermore, coming back to the comparison with Southern European
economies, around half of the domestic credit to the private nonfinancial sector
was extended to households in Portugal and Spain, while in the CEEC-3 the
corresponding share of household credits amounted to between only 11.6% and
23.2%. The relatively low level of household credits may affect, in particular,
gross fixed capital formation by households in the form of housing investments.
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20 Note that there is fairly large leeway for national differences in categorizing the
outstanding credit stock into standard loans, watch loans and nonperforming loans (i.e.
substandard, doubtful and loss loans).Table 20: International Comparison of the Stock of Domestic and Foreign Credit to
the Private Sector
annual average outstanding volumes in % of GDP
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1994 1997 2000 1995 1997 2000 1994 1997 2000
Domestic
to nonbanks 16.6 19.8 26.4 21.6 20.9 25.6 63.7 63.8 53.3
Foreign
to nonbanks 1.9 4.2 11.0 5.5 9.3 13.0 10.8 16.9 17.1
to banks 1.5 2.1 3.7 3.6 8.9 11.6 4.6 17.6 17.8
Portugal Spain
1994 1997 1998 1994 1997 1998
Domestic
to nonbanks 61.2 71.5 84.1 55.0 59.4 65.1
Foreign
to nonbanks 15.5 13.4 12.2 6.8 5.7 5.9
to banks 20.2 41.3 51.3 21.4 25.2 29.8
Note:
Domestic credit to nonbanks comprises domestic credit extended by resident commercial
banks (including foreign-owned banks) to private nonbanks.
Domestic nonbanks do not include “other financial institutions,” with the exception of Portugal
in the year 1994.
Foreign credit excludes (cross-border) intercompany loans, but includes the outstanding stock
of both cross-border loans extended by foreign banks and international bonds held by foreign
investors.
Source: IMF, national central banks, WIIW, OeNB.
The  stock of foreign cross-border credit granted by nonresident banks to
private nonbanks was between 11% and 17% of GDP in the CEEC-3 on
average in 2000, while it was 12% and 6%, respectively, of GDP in Portugal
and Spain on average in 1998 (see Table 20). In all the CEEC-3 as well as in
Portugal and Spain, these foreign banks’ credits are predominantly medium-
to long-term credits. While the stock of foreign banks’ credit was tangibly
lower than the stock of domestic banks’ credit to private nonbanks in all
countries listed in Table 20, its growth rate was significantly higher than the
growth rate of the stock of domestic credit to private nonbanks only in the
CEEC-3, substantially increasing its ratio to GDP there. This was certainly
linked to the liberalization of medium- and long-term capital flows in the
1990s. On the other hand, the corresponding ratio of the stock of foreign
banks’ credit to GDP even declined in Portugal and Spain, while the ratio of
the stock of domestic credit to GDP sharply increased.
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higher in Portugal and Spain at 51.3% and 29.8%, respectively, of GDP on
average in 1998 than in the CEEC-3, where it amounted to between 3.7% and
17.8% of GDPon average in 2000 (see Table 20). In Portugal and Spain, these
ratios have increased substantially since the full liberalization of short-term
capital flows at the end of 1992 and thus the banks’ cross-border liabilities
consisted above all of short-term capital in 1998. Correspondingly, the Czech
Republic, which has had the most liberal regime for capital flows (including
short-term capital) for several years, showed by far the highest ratio among
the CEEC-3 at 17.8%. Also in the Czech Republic, these cross-border
liabilities of commercial banks were predominantly short-term, with a share
of about two thirds of banks’ total cross-border liabilities. This stands in
contrast to Poland and Hungary. In these two countries, the low level of
banks’ short-term external liabilities may be explained partly by the high
foreign ownership in this sector and by capital account restrictions still in
place at the end of 2000.
To sum it up, in our view the liberalization of short-term capital flows led to
a huge inflow of short-term capital to refund resident banks in Portugal and
Spain. This fueled the growth of domestic credit to the private nonfinancial
sector, which – inter alia – led to a partial substitution of predominantly
medium- and long-term cross-border credit taken out abroad from foreign
banks by the private nonfinancial sector.
In contrast, most CEEC-3 had not yet fully liberalized short-term capital
flows at the end of the year 2000, and the CEEC-3 country which did so early
and comprehensively, the Czech Republic, showed a pattern different from
that of Portugal or Spain. There, domestic credit growth does not seem to
have been enhanced by the inflow of short-term capital to banks, and thus
medium- and long-term cross-border credit by foreign banks to the private
nonfinancial sector grew in parallel to that inflow. This indicates that the
domestic banking system could not efficiently handle the additional funding
to successfully compete with these foreign cross-border credits to private
nonbanks. On the one hand, it is certainly true that the resident commercial
banks could have done even worse by increasing domestic credit by
imprudently channeling short-term funds taken up abroad into new, risky
loans to the private sector, thus adding new nonperforming loans to the
existing stock of such loans. On the other hand, the resident commercial
banks did not use the short-term funds from abroad to extend new profitable
loans to the private sector which could have been denominated in foreign
currency and thus could have constituted an alternative to medium- and long-
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banking system did not successfully intermediate foreign short-term funds to
productive investments of the private sector. In addition, existing structural
deficiencies (in particular at the corporate level) prevented the Czech
economy from reaping the potential benefits of the early full liberalization of
the capital account; moreover, this liberalization increased the vulnerability of
the currency regime. In view of these developments, the full liberalization of
capital flows was probably premature in the Czech Republic.
4.1.2 Comparison of the Sources of External Finance to Enterprises
The following table, Table 21, shows components of external funding of
enterprises relative to the gross fixed capital investment (GFCI) on average in
the years 1997 and 1998 and – for the CEEC-3 – in the years 1999 and 2000.
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Generally, the internal sources of enterprises to fund their fixed capital
investment are more important than the external sources in all the countries
that are compared in Table 21. Usually, depreciation is the most important
part of internal funding, followed by retained profits. For the CEEC-3 it was
shown that also the sale of already completely depreciated assets constituted
quite an important source of funding in the years 1995 to 1998 (see Köke et
al., 2001).
In Poland and Hungary as well as in selected EU countries (Portugal, Spain
and Germany), the change in the stock of domestic credit extended by resident
banks to enterprises was the most important source of external funding to
enterprises, with a ratio of between 11.4% and 32.8% of GFCI, while in the
U.S.A. it was equity issuance due to capital increases, with a ratio of 14.3%.
Hence, the predominance of loan-based (“bank-based”) versus equity-based
(“market-based”) intermediation exists in both the EU and the CEEC-3.
While the change in the stock of credit generally shows the difference
between the flows of new lending and repayment, it may also reflect
extraordinary changes. Thus, the negative value in the Czech Republic on
average in the years 1999 and 2000, reflects – inter alia – the transfer of
nonperforming loans from the commercial banks to the state-owned
consolidation banks. After adjusting for this statistical change, the ratio of the
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21 This table does not contain a comprehensive list of all possible sources of external
funding. For instance, privately raised new equity capital is not included. Moreover, one should
be aware that GFCI includes not only fixed capital investment by the corporate sector, but also
household investment, in particular in housing.increase in the stock of domestic bank credit to the corporate sector to gross
fixed capital investment can be estimated as 6.5% on average in 1997 and
1998 and 5.2% on average in 1999 and 2000. These ratios show domestic
bank credit as the most important funding source in the Czech Republic, as
well, while their low level in comparison to Poland and Hungary seems to
reflect the weakness of the Czech banking sector in those years, which
probably contributed to the recession. However, looking at individual years,
it has to be noted that the adjusted ratio already improved from -5.0% in 1998
over 2.0% in 1999 to 8.3% in the year 2000.
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Table 21: International Comparison of Channels of Financial Intermediation to
Enterprises
external corporate funding relative to gross fixed capital investment (GFCI),
net flows or changes in stocks in % of GFCI
Poland Hungary Czech Republic Portugal Spain GermanyU.S.A.
1998 2000 1998 2000 1998 2000 1998 1998 1998 1998
Domestic sources
Bank credit 17.1 11.4 20.4 18.9 5.5 –8.6 32.8 19.9 17.0 6.8
Bond issues 2.3 1.7 1.2 0.1 2.1 2.9 3.5 1.4
Equity issues 2.8 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 7.6 4.8 3.8 14.3
Foreign sources
Intercompany loans 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.1 6.3 4.1 2.8 2.1
Bank loans 2.8 3.3 3.2 13.6 5.3 3.7 2.2 2.3
Bond issues 2.2 1.4 –0.3 –0.1 1.8 1.0 0.3 0.0
Note:
1998 = average ratio in the years 1997 and 1998. 2000 = average ratio in the years 1999 and
2000.
Domestic banks’ credit comprises domestic credit (including foreign currency-denominated
credit) extended by resident commercial banks (including foreign-owned banks) to the
corporate sector.
In the Czech Republic, the ratios reflect – inter alia – the transfer of nonperforming loans from
the commercial banks to the state-owned consolidation bank. After adjusting for this statistical
change, the ratios can be estimated as 6.5% on average in 1997 and 1998 and 5.2% on average
in 1999 and 2000.
Equity issues: capital-raising public offers on the stock exchange.
Intercompany loans: net disbursements, i.e. disbursments minus repayments, by foreign
(parent) company.
Foreign banks’ loans: net disbursements, i.e. disbursments minus repayments; includes the
relatively small amount of enterprises’trade credit.
Foreign bond issues: net issues of international bonds, i.e. gross issues minus repayment.
Source: Central European Rating Agency – CERA S.A., Federation International des Bourses de
Valeur – FIBV, national central banks, national stock exchanges, WIIW, OeNB.In Hungary, net inflows from foreign cross-border credits granted by
nonresident banks came second as a source of funding on average in the years
1997 to 2000, while in Poland and the Czech Republic net inflows from cross-
border intercompany loans of transnational corporations were a slightly more
important source of financing than foreign banks’ credits. Corresponding to
our analysis of the outstanding stock volumes, the net inflow from foreign
banks’ credit was also higher in the CEEC-3 than in Portugal and Spain. In
contrast, in Portugal and Spain equity issuance due to capital increases was
the second most important source of external financing with a ratio of 7.6%
and 4.8%, respectively, of GFCI.
In Poland and the Czech Republic, the net issuance of domestic debt
securities ranked fourth among the categories listed with a ratio of 2% to 3%
in the years 1997 to 2000. In addition, the corporate sector in these countries
gained some financing by the net issuance of international debt securities in
the period covered.
It was only in Poland that equity issuance due to capital increases made
a nonnegligible contribution to enterprises’ external funding. Its size was
roughly similar to that of external funding by the net issuance of domestic
debt securities and to that of the net issuance of international debt securities
on average in the years 1997 to 2000. With the exception of Poland, equity
issuance due to capital increases has not yet constituted an important source
of external funding in the CEEC-3. Even in Poland, the level of such funding
was considerably lower than that achieved in the selected EU countries
presented in Table 21 in the years 1997 and 1998. However, one should not
forget that the equity markets have played some role as an additional channel
for the sale of state stakes in Poland and Hungary (see subsection 4.2).
4.2 Funding of the Public Sector
4.2.1 The Role of the Equity Market for the Public Sector
Up to now, the most important contribution of equity markets in the CEEC-3
to the macroeconomic development of the respective countries probably
consisted in providing a channel through which the state could sell stakes in
companies as part of the overall privatization process. Proceeds from such
sales reached about 0.9% of GDP in Poland on average in 1997 and 1998,
while they were about 3.3% of GDP in Hungary in 1997. However, in Poland
this ratio declined to 0.2% on average in 1999 and 2000, and there were no
sizeable flotations by the Hungarian state in the years 1998 to 2000.
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The publicly issued debt securities denominated in local currency gained
considerable importance within the central government debt denominated in
local currency, as Table 23 shows. Such securities were the main or exclusive
source of financing budget deficits, while in parallel the inherited stock of
central bank loans denominated in local currency to the central government
was cut back drastically. At the end of 2000, the share of publicly issued debt
securities denominated in local currency (excluding retail securities) in
central government debt denominated in local currency amounted to between
70% and 100% in the CEEC-3.
The share of external and internal debt denominated in foreign currency in
total central government debt fell considerably from 1993 to 2000 in Poland
and the Czech Republic and from 1997 to 2000 in Hungary. In Poland, this
sharp decline can partly be explained by the partial write-off of external debt
by the London Club and the Paris Club in 1994. At the end of 2000, the share
of foreign currency-denominated debt in total central government debt was
lowest in the Czech Republic, which had, in addition, also the lowest total
central-government-debt-to-GDP ratio, as Table 22 shows.
Table 22: Ratio of Central Government Debt to GDP (in %)
end of period
1993 1997 2000
Poland 82.9 46.9 38.7
Hungary 88.7 62.9 55.5
Czech Republic 15.6 10.7 15.1
Source: national ministries of finance, OeNB.
Comparing the share of foreign currency-denominated debt in total debt of
the central government (see Table 23) with the corporate sector’s foreign
currency position in percent of total credit to the corporate sector (see
Table 5), we can see that the government’s share of foreign currency debt was
roughly similar to the corporate sector’s net foreign currency position in
Poland and Hungary. Thus, the vulnerability of the public sector and the
corporate sector to nominal depreciations of the local currency may seem
comparable at first sight. However, the beneficial impact of nominal
depreciations on the public sector’s revenue side will probably be rather
limited, while it will very probably be more pronounced on the corporate
sector’s revenues.
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debt securities denominated in local currency (including retail securities).
In Poland and Hungary, the shares of both domestic nonbanks and foreign
portfolio investors increased at the expense of the share of the banking system
from 1997 to 2000. In Poland, this development was a continuation of the
change from 1993 to 1997. In contrast, the Czech Republic witnessed
a similar development only from 1993 to 1997 and a quite interesting reversal
of this trend from 1997 to 2000. Thus, in the Czech Republic the commercial
banks were still the largest group of investors, with a share of 65% and 62%,
respectively. Central banks held no such securities at the end of 2000 in any
of the CEEC-3. It is probably only in Hungary that the demand for central
government securities is really broadly based and, in particular, directly
household-based with a large and rapidly growing share (21% at the end of
2000). This was to a large extent due to the policy of issuing debt securities
directly aimed at households as investors, i.e. publicly issued, but
nonmarketable bonds (retail bonds). In contrast, Poland did not start to issue
such bonds (“savings bonds”) until 1999. It is noteworthy that the share of
foreign investors did not exceed 18% in any of the CEEC-3 at the end of
2000.
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Table 23: Structure of Central Government Debt
by type of debt, in %; end of period
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1993 1997 2000 1993 1997 2000 1993 1997 2000
Debt denominated in local currency
21.9 40.2 52.3 56.0 52.5 60.7 54.9 78.9 93.2
Publicly issued 15.3 27.1 37.9 14.7 30.9 42.3 23.4 75.6 93.2
Retail bonds 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.3 4.5 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Privately placed 3.3 5.8 8.9 15.2 7.7 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Loans, etc. 3.3 7.3 4.9 24.8 9.4 4.2 31.4 3.3 0.0
Debt denominated in foreign currency
78.1 59.8 47.7 44.0 47.5 39.3 45.1 21.1 6.8
Internal 7.1 6.7 2.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
External 71.0 53.1 45.3 44.0 47.2 39.0 45.1 21.1 6.8
Notes:
Hungary: The external debt for the government that was channeled through the central bank is
included in the external debt denominated in foreign currency in 1993, 1997 and 2000.
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22 In the Czech Republic, where a sizeable corporate bond market coexists with the
government bond market, the share of foreign investors in the total capitalization of the local
currency-denominated bond market (including both the corporate and the government bond
market) can be estimated to have fallen from 17.8% at the end of 1997 to only 5.4% at the end
of 2000. This probably not only reflects the low level of yields at the end of 2000 in the Czech
Republic, but also negative foreign perceptions of the debt servicing ability of the corporate
sector.
Table 24: Holder Structure of publicly issued central government debt securities in
local currency
share in total, in %; end of period
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1993 1997 2000 1997 2000 1993 1997 2000
Total volume outstanding 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
All domestic investors 100 91 83 96 82 100 91 96
All nonbanks 14 32 47 59 61 3 45 31
thereof: retail securities 0 0 2 13 15 0 0 0
Intra-government 2
Private nonfinancial sector 39 35 1 13 2
Households 18 21 0 2 1
thereof: retail securities 0 0 2 13 15 0 0 0
Nonprofit institutions
Nonfinancial companies 21 14 1 11 2
Institutional investors 20 27 2 32 27
Privatization funds 2
Mutual funds 9 6 3
Pension funds 2 8
Insurance companies 10 12 19
Other financial corporations 2
Banking system 86 59 35 37 21 97 46 65
Credit institutions 46 59 35 32 20 81 46 64
Central bank 39 0 0 5 0 16 0 0
All foreign investors 0 9 17 4 18 0 9 4
Note: Includes retail securities (classified as publicly issued but nonmarketable debt
securities).
Source: national ministries of finance, OeNB.4.3 Vulnerability to Short Term Capital Outflows?
Recent experience with financial crises in Mexico, Southeast Asia and Russia
demonstrated the importance (besides other factors) of vulnerability to short-
term capital outflows for the outbreak and transmission of financial
turbulences. Thus, in the following section the issue of the CEEC-3’s current
vulnerability to short-term capital outflows will be analyzed, using a number
of indicators.
Figure 5 shows the relation between a broad range of liquid assets that can be
easily switched into foreign assets (broad money including foreign currency-
denominated deposits) and gross official reserves. As the figure shows, this
ratio was markedly lower in the CEEC-3 at the end of 2000 than in a number
of countries hit by financial crises.
Figure 5
Another indicator that has been associated with financial contagion effects in
the recent past is the ratio of external debt repayments due in the short term
to gross official reserves. This ratio comprises both short-term external debt
(i.e. external debt with an original maturity of below one year) and
repayments on medium- and long-term external debt due within one year.
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23 In each of the
CEEC-3, this indicator was below 100%.
Figure 6
The banking sector’s part of the short-term external debt amounted to only
9% of gross official reserves in Poland and 23% in Hungary, while it was
significantly larger in the Czech Republic with 50% at the end of 2000. But
even the Czech Republic’s ratio was by far below the corresponding ratios of
above 300% in Portugal and Spain at the end of 1998. (Relating the banking
sector’s short-term external debt to broad money supply, does not change the
picture by much, with a ratio between 3% to 17% in the CEEC-3 and 43% to
53% in Portugal and Spain.)
However, it should be noted that this indicator does not include redemptions
on local currency-denominated debt instruments held by foreign investors
which are due within one year and which could be quickly transferred abroad
unless they are reinvested. These flows are worth mentioning in Poland and
especially in Hungary, where they reached 9% of gross official reserves at the
end of 2000.
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23 These ratios were partly derived on the basis of estimates, assuming an average maturity
of four years for the outstanding stock of private external debt in Poland and of total external
debt in the Czech Republic. They exclude the repayment due within one year on local currency-
denominated bonds held by foreign investors.Another item that is not included in the ratio between external debt
repayments due in the short term and gross official reserves, but may
contribute to short-term commitments in foreign currency, is interest
payments on external debt as well as on foreign-held debt instruments
denominated in local currency. These flows are the main factor in the
negative net income balance in the CEEC-3, with the exception of the Czech
Republic. As Figure 7 shows, negative net income reached sizeable amounts
in Hungary (see Figure 7).
Figure 7
As shown in section 3, the liquidity of domestic capital markets is relatively
high in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Thus, foreign investors can
quickly sell their portfolio investment denominated in local currency and
demand foreign currency for the conversion and repatriation of their
proceeds. Therefore, Table 25 reports the total stock of foreign-held portfolio
investment in local currency-denominated debt securities and in equities in
relation to gross official reserves. In general, this ratio is higher for equity
portfolio investment.
However, equity portfolio investment can basically be expected to cause less
pressure than debt portfolio investment on official reserves in the case of
outflows of portfolio investment. A massive flight by foreign investors from
the domestic securities markets would cause a larger fall in equity prices than
in debt prices (because of the higher volatility of equity), thereby reducing the
value of proceeds from the sale of securities to be converted into foreign
currency.
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markets to overall macroeconomic developments has been rather modest up
to now when measured in terms of the funding of the corporate sector (see
section 4.1). Until now, the relatively liquid equity markets have above all
provided owners of equity capital, mainly foreign investors, with additional
opportunities to optimize their asset portfolio according to their preferences
and risk attitudes (see section 3). This raises the question whether the stability
risk of financial contagion that the strong foreign participation involves for
the whole economy – although it is probably still at a manageable level – does
not exceed the benefits of international integration of CEEC-3 equity markets
for the national economies.
The size of accumulated short-term capital inflows other than portfolio
investment, in particular the stock of short-term loans to enterprises and
deposits with domestic banks, and its potentially destabilizing impact (e.g. on
the confidence of residents into their own national currency) were still
relatively small at the end of 2000, in particular in Poland and Hungary (see
section 4.1). In these two countries, such inflows were stemmed by capital
account restrictions still in place at the end of 2000. In addition, the low level
of banks’ short-term external liabilities may be explained partly by the high
foreign ownership in the banking sector in Poland and in Hungary.
This analysis does not deal with the risk off-balance-sheet positions imply for
gross official reserves. However, we do not expect this risk to be very large,
as the figures published indicate that off-balance-sheet transactions are rather
small. In Poland and Hungary, these positions appear to be small mainly
because of the restrictions on off-balance-sheet transactions applicable at the
end of 2000.
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Table 25: Risk Exposure to Foreign Capital Outflows
foreign portfolio holdings in % of official gross reserves (excluding gold); end
of period
Poland Hungary Czech Republic
1997 1999 2000 1997 1999 2000 1997 1999 2000
Equity 13 20 22 31 40 27 31 21 23
Debt 8 7 16 4 16 20 13 9 5
Note: 
“debt” comprises foreign portfolio holdings of debt securities denominated in local currency
of both the central government and other issuers.
Source: BIS, IMF, national central banks, national ministries of finance, OeNB.When evaluating risks to financial stability arising from sudden capital
outflows, exchange rate regimes have to be taken into consideration, too. As
none of the countries covered in this paper uses an explicit exchange rate
target with a narrow band at present, the central banks are not committed to
meeting demand for foreign currency at a fixed rate. Thus, capital outflows
produce less pressure on official reserves than under a fixed-rate regime.
Moreover, short-term inflows are discouraged by the exchange rate risks that
result from the flexible exchange rate regimes which are in place in these
countries.
On the basis of the indicators presented above, it seems fair to conclude that
vulnerability to sudden sizeable outflows of foreign capital (in addition to the
scheduled debt service), which, for instance, may be triggered by financial
contagion from the international markets and may itself provoke an outflow
of domestic capital, can be considered rather low in the CEEC-3. However,
this conclusion may change fairly rapidly if circumstances change
accordingly.
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5.1 The Legal and Supervisory Determinants of Financial
Development
In the view of classical finance theory
24 financial contracts are completely
described by their prices and the real income streams they provide. In this
theory the enforcement of contracts is taken for granted and their legal form
that gives the holder not only the right to cash flows but also certain specific
decision rights is considered irrelevant. In view of modern finance theory,
especially the recent contributions to the theory of contracts
25, it has turned
out that this picture of the financial system is seriously incomplete. This
theory has been able to explain why the rights attached to securities are so
important in practice. Basically the reason lies in the so called
“incompleteness of contracts”. Incompleteness of a financial contract means
that in reality it can never specify the rights to cash flows under all possible
circumstances. This fact combined with the natural conflict of interest
between insiders of a firm, like for instance the incumbent management, and
external investors makes it necessary that financial contracts specify
ownership rights that provide suitable incentives and enable investors to
extract the return on their investment from insiders. The incomplete contract
view has thus redirected attention of financial economists to the legal decision
rights attached to financial contracts. Once the importance of decision rights
is taken to the center of the discussion it is quite a natural step to place a great
deal more of attention to the legal environment that enforces and guarantee
these rights. It becomes an aspect of tremendous importance for the efficient
functioning of the financial system. Research that has been following the
insights of this literature has investigated closely and systematically the
relations between the functioning of the financial system and the legal and
institutional structure it is embedded in. This research is strongly connected
with work by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1996, 1997)
– see also: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, Levine (2001). We want to look at the legal
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24 Classical Finance Theory views firms basically as real income streams from investments,
independent by which specific legal contracts these cash flows are financed. This theory has
been expressed in the classical theory of net present value, the Fisher Separation theorem, the
Modigliani-Miller theorem and the capital asset pricing model. (See Milgrom and Roberts,
1992, p 448)
25 See Hart, 1995.environment with respect to investor rights and the financial system in the
CEEC-3 in the light of this literature in the first part of this section.
In the second part we take a closer look at banking regulation and
supervision. The banking system is a particularly important part of the
financial system that is subject to an extensive set of regulatory rules all
around the world. The arguments for the regulation of the banking system
mostly draw on historical experience – most importantly the great depression
– and on a variety of theoretical arguments from the theory of incentives and
information. 
26 The instruments that have been most frequently discussed in
economic policy debates in the recent past are capital requirements, deposit
insurance and regulatory monitoring and supervision. Among these fields
capital requirements have gained most attention because of the work of the
Basle Committee. Regulatory instruments that restrict banking activities by
portfolio restrictions on banks have a more prominent role in the U.S. due to
regulatory rules that go back to the Glass-Steagall act. These types of
restrictions do not play such a prominent role in Europe where banks have
a long tradition of universal banking. These instruments still do not exhaust
all measures of banking regulation because various restrictions on entry and
competition in the banking industry are in place all around the world. Since
the banking system including market structure, entry, foreign ownership etc.
has already been discussed in quite some detail in a previous chapter we do
not discuss these issues here.
The debate about regulation and supervision is still very active and no definite
conclusions about a sort of “best practice” have been reached so far.
Concerning the empirical facts of how regulatory regimes work in reality,
there has recently been substantial progress due to the arduous data collection
work of Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). These data allow for instance
a comparative description of regulatory regimes between countries or
between groups of countries. In our paper we construct from these data a set
of indicators that allow a descriptive comparison of the regulatory regime in
the CEEC-3 with the group of the EU-15. We are therefore able to get a rough
picture of how these countries compare to the EU-15 group with respect to the
most intensely debated fields of banking regulation and supervision.
In this section we concentrate on two main aspects. First we give
a comparison with respect to the stringency of capital regulation. Second we
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26 See Freixas and Rochet, 1996.try to give a picture of regulatory supervision under two aspects. On the one
hand we are interested in the formal power that is given by the law to
supervisory authorities. This has to be contrasted with the actual amount of
resources that are available to give these powers real force and the stringency
with which the rules are practically enforced.
5.2 Methodology
All of the data we consider in this chapter are index variables constructed by
assigning values to specific questionnaire answers in a way that higher or
lower values of the index can be interpreted as more or less restrictions on
certain activities or higher or lower stringency etc. Thus the indices have
a strictly ordinal character and express rank orderings only. To summarize the
information contained in these data we calculate for each index the mode, the
median, the median deviation and the quartiles of the EU-15 to compare the
CEEC-3 individually against this group.
27 We think that for this kind of
ordinal index data these measures provide a meaningful and concise
description.
In addition we give a visual description of the data. The graphical description
shows in a horizontal bar chart the values of an index for each of the EU-15
countries (or for those countries in the EU group for which the data are
available). At the top of the bar chart the index values of the CEEC-3 are
shown. These bars have a clearly visible distance to the EU group so that both
groups can be easily distinguished. The bar chart contains an inlet graphic
describing the distribution of the EU-15 data by a box and whiskers plot. The
box is plotted around the lower and the upper quartile. The median is shown
as a vertical bar through the box. Observations outside the quartiles are
connected with the sides of the box by lines.
28 Extreme outliers are shown as
dots. We plot the positions of the CEEC-3 countries into the box plot at their
respective index values and represent these points by Cz for Czech republic,
H for Hungary and Pl for Poland. This gives in one view a graphical summary
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27The mode gives the most frequent value in the data, the median is the value that partitions
the data so that half of the observations lie below and half of the observations lie above it. The
median deviation is a measure of dispersion. Half of the observations are contained in the
interval around the median plus minus the median deviation. The Quartiles are the values that
partition the observations in the ratio 1:3.
28 The length of these lines is usually determined more or less arbitrarily. The usual rule is
to to determine the largest observation that is smaller than the 0.75-quartile plus 1.5 times the
difference between the 0.75 and 0.25 quartile. Symmetrically the length of the other line is
calculated. If an observation is outside of these frontiers it is shown in the graph as a dot.of the distribution of the EU-15 data and shows the relative individual
positions of the CEEC-3.
5.3 Legal Environment in the CEEC-3 in Comparison with EU-15
The literature on the legal determinants of external finance has grown rapidly
in the last decade. This literature pioneered by the work of La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1996, 1997) has introduced certain
indicators that attempt to assess shareholder rights, creditor rights and the
general quality of law enforcement. Of course the indicators used in this
literature are arguably selective even if one concentrates narrowly on the
financial system, as we do here. What makes these particular indicators
however interesting for this research is the following fact: A central result La
Porta et al. is that the econometric analysis of cross country data supports the
view that these variables are important for the fact of how conductive the legal
system is for the availability of external finance. In the following we construct
some summary statistics that follows the indicators of this literature and use it
to produce a comparison of the CEEC-3 with the group of the EU 15.
The first set of indicators we consider assesses shareholder and creditor
rights. They describe the degree to which the legal code of a country protects
the claims of secured creditors and minority shareholders. The data for the
EU-15 group are taken from La Porta et al. (1996), the data for the CEEC-3
are collected by our own.
29 We complement the description of these indicators
with indicators that assess the effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing
contracts. Following La Porta et al. (1997) we take three indicators. One gives
an assessment of the law and order tradition of the country, the other assesses
the risk that government will modify contracts after they have been signed.
Modification means, repudiation, postponement or the reduction in
governments financial obligations. Finally we report an index for corruption.
Again the data for the EU-15 are taken from La Porta et al. (1996) and from
the International Country Risk Guide for the CEEC-3 countries.
5.3.1 Rights of Outside Investors
Though there is no general consensus on the issue whether investor protection
contributes to the availability of external finance and to economic efficiency
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29 I am indebted to Andreas Netzer for his help in collecting these data. The answers to my
questionaire were kindly provided by Dr. Martin Dolecek for the Czech Republic and by
Dr. Ágnes Szent-Ivány for Hungary.there is a fairly large body of research in support of this view.
30 Here we
follow the view of this literature that investor protection enhances economic
efficiency. The index of shareholder rights basically describes how easy it is
for minority shareholders to voice discontent with the management of the
firm and to exercise their voting rights. The indicator for creditor rights
basically tries to capture what the literature considers to be the essential
aspect of debt finance, namely the right to repossess collateral and the right
to have an influence on the reorganisation of the company in case of default
(see for instance Vishny, 1994 or Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992).
5.3.1.1 Creditor Rights
Beginning with creditor rights we first look at the reference group of the
EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg, where no data were available). The data for
Poland are at the moment not available but we hope to be able to add these
data in the near future. The creditor rights index is composed of four variables
which are described in detail in an appendix. The basic idea of the index is to
assign a higher value if the law makes it easier for creditors to extract the
return on their investment from insiders. This is described by assessing legal
creditor strength in case of default.
Creditor Rights
Range: 0 – 4 (higher range means better protection of creditor rights)
EU (without Luxembourg)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
34 1 3 1 2 3 3
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
23 N A
The summary statistic shows that the median value of the creditor right index
is fairly high for the EU group as a whole. The Czech Republic ranks at the
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30 This research is surveyed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).lower quartile of the EU distribution, while Hungary lies at the median. Thus
as far as the commercial code, company and insolvency law is concerned
– according the Index – it is harder for outside creditors in the Czech Republic
to extract the return on their investment from insiders than in the median of
the EU group. A graphical representation of the creditor index data is given
below.
Figure 8: Creditor Rights
5.3.1.2 Shareholder Rights
Shareholder Rights are summarized by an index that is named “Anti-Director
Rights” by La Porta et al. (1996). The rights that enable shareholders to
extract the return on their investment from insiders is mostly connected to the
voting rights in important corporate matters such as the election of directors.
The index ranges from 0 to 5 with a higher value indicating stronger a legal
position of (minority) shareholders against management.
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Range: 0 – 5 (higher range means better protection of shareholders)
EU (without Luxembourg)




Czech Republic Hungary Poland
44 N A
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the statistics shows that both Hungary and the
Czech Republic rank far above the EU median, even more they rank above
the upper EU-quartile and – as far as the legal situation is concerned – equal
the U.K., which has a shareholder oriented financial system. Maybe this
strong emphasis on shareholder rights reflects the shareholder oriented view
of foreign advisors and investors on this particular aspect of the legal design.
Probably the strong legal position of shareholders can not come to full force
due to the still modest role that equity plays in external finance as we have
seen in section 4.1. It has to be stressed that the EU-15 is of interest as
a reference group only as a first approximation. The countries within the EU
belong to quite different legal traditions as far as the protection of investors is
concerned. This point is forcefully argued and documented in La Porta et al.
(1997) It is therefore not surprising that within the EU group we find the
lowest as well as the highest index rank. The big difference in index ranks
between the Czech Republic and Hungary to the EU group as well as the huge
heterogeneity within the EU group, becomes even more apparent from the
graphics shown below.
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5.3.2 The General Quality of Law Enforcement
Of course any legal code can only be effective if it is vigorously enforced. We
therefore attempt to complement the discussion of the rights of outside
investors with general indices that try to assess this aspect of the legal system.
Since we want to compare the data with the data in La Porta et al. (1996) we
used the same source as these authors, namely the International Country Risk
Guide, produced at a regular interval by the PRS Group, a U.S. based risk
assessment firm.
31 The International Country Risk guide contains three risk
components which we use to describe the general quality of law enforcement.
The first variable, law and order, tries to capture the strength and impartiality
of the legal system as well as the popular observance of the law. The index
ranges from 0 to 6, where a high index indicates a stronger tradition of law
and order. The subcomponents of the index can rank a country high in terms
of it’s legal system but low if the popular observance of the law is weak. Since
La Porta et al. (1996) have rescaled their variable to a range between 0 and
10 we have also rescaled our data, to make them comparable.
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.31 I have to thank Mrs. Nora Ruthig from PRS for her help and support.A second measure tries to assess corruption within the political system.
Though there is no general consensus about the issue, there are quite a lot of
arguments, theoretical and empirical to support the view that corruption is
detrimental to foreign investment. The corruption variable is again rescaled
form it’s initial range between 0 and 6 to the range of 0 and 10 to make it
comparable with the numbers in La Porta et al. (1996).
The last indicator we present tries to measure the risk of expropriation by
outright confiscation or forced nationalization as well as the risk that agreed
upon contracts are modified ex post, postponed or scaled down. For this last
indicator it is not possible to compare the numbers for the EU and the
CEEC-3 directly because the PRS rating system has been modified in 1997.
The variables used by La Porta et al. (1996) were merged into a general new
variable, called “investment quality”. We made an attempt to construct
a proxy variable from the old indicators by La Porta et al. (1996). Though
both indices are meant to measure similar things the comparison should be
made with this caveat in mind. For the comparative description we took the
average index numbers from the last four years for the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland.
5.3.2.1 Rule of Law
The summary statistics shows quite a significant difference between the
EU-group and the CEEC-3. The results are reported in the following table:
Rule of Law
Range: 0 – 10 (higher range means stricter rule of law)
EU (without Luxembourg)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
10 10 6 9 1 8 9 10
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
87 7
We see that the Czech Republic is at the lower Quartile of the EU distribution
whereas Hungary and Poland rank below.
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5.3.2.2 Corruption
The index for corruption used in the International Country Risk Guide
assesses the risk that illegal payments are required at higher and lower levels
of government. Ahigher index indicates lower risk of corruption. To make the
data comparable with La Porta et al. we rescale the values from the initial
range between 0 and 6 to the range 0 and 10.
Corruption
Range: 0 – 10 (higher range means lower risk of corruption)
EU (without Luxembourg)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
91 0 69 1 7 9 1 0
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
78 5
All CEEC-3 countries lie below the EU median. Poland is in the lower
quartile and the Czech Republic is at the lower quartile of the EU distribution.
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picture.
Figure 11: Corruption
The details of the picture shows that there is quite some variation within the
EU group itself.
5.3.2.3 Governments Attitude Towards Inward Investment
Finally we report an indicator that attempts to assess the general attitude of
government to inward investment. It captures the risk of expropriation as well
as the risk that contracts are modified, postponed or scaled down. The
measure for the EU as taken from La Port et al. is to be read with a caveat.
Since PRS changed the index system in 1997 the variable “Investment
Profile”, which we have for the CEEC-3 countries measures similar things but
not exactly the same things as the variables in La Porta et al. We tried to make
the measures roughly comparable but want to point out there might be
problems in comparing them directly.
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Range: 0 – 12 (higher range means lower risk of expropriation or repudiation
of contracts)
EU (without Luxembourg)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
11 12 8 11 1 11 11 12
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
89 1 0
All CEE3 countries are here clearly below the median, where the Czech
Republic appears to be even an outlier with three ranks below the median.
This picture is surprising since it is in contradiction to the fact that among the
CEEC-3 the Czech Republic has recently attracted the largest volume of
foreign direct investment. The picture shows the details.
Figure 12: Government Attitude to Inward Investment
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Before we qualify the broader picture emerging from the analysis of the data
we should note that the information that is described above is a systematic
assessment. With this caveat in mind we see that the legal system in the
CEEC-3 assigns very strong rights to shareholders whereas the legal position
of creditors is weaker. From the analysis in the previous chapters we have
learned that stock markets are still playing a minor role in external finance.
Thus the shareholder rights are perhaps not yet so important. Once stock
markets have fully developed shareholders might find themselves legally in
a comparable positions as shareholders in the U.K. and certainly above the
EU median.
Going to the quality of law enforcement in general we see that the CEEC-3
rank uniformly below the EU median. Thus it seems that while in terms of
formal law the CEEC-3 are in quite a strong position as far as the legal
protection of outside investors is concerned and thus have legally friendly
conditions for external finance, the weak spot in the current situation is rather
the practice of enforcement than in insufficient legislation.
5.4 Banking Regulation and Supervision
In an ambitious project financed by the World Bank Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2001) recently have collected a large body of international data on banking
regulation and supervision. This database covers 107 countries and is based on
surveys of national regulatory and supervisory authorities around the world.
32
The survey contains detailed data on the government safety net, restrictions on
banks asset holdings, capital requirements, chartering and bank supervision,
disclosure requirements, consumer protection and restrictions of competition.
The indicators we use are constructed from these data building on the work
by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) who make various suggestions for an
appropriate grouping of the data.
5.4.1 Capital Stringency
Stringency of capital regulation is based on the Capital Regulatory Index
suggested by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). The index is constructed from
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32 The data are available on the internet under:
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/intrstweb.htmanswers to a set of questions that ask for restrictions on the leverage potential
for capital on the one hand and on the sources of funds that are counted as
regulatory capital on the other hand. 
33 The yes answers are assigned a value
of one and the no answers are assigned a value of zero. The answers are
constructed such that higher values of the index can be interpreted as greater
stringency. In the EU group the index could not be constructed for Finland,
because not all data were available. The index ranges from 0 to 8.
Capital Regulatory Index
Range: 0 – 8 (higher range means higher stringency)
EU (without Finland)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
68 4 6 1 5 6 7
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
24 5
The summary statistics shows that the median of the EU-group is at an index
value of 6, the value that is achieved also most frequently within the group.
The median deviation shows that 50 % of the group are within the index
values 5 and 7. Compared to the EU group all CEEC-3 countries are below
the median value. Both the Hungary and the Czech Republic are in the lower
Quartile of the stringency index. Within the CEEC-3 group Poland has the
highest value and thus has the relatively most stringent capital regulation.
Poland is exactly at the lower Quartile of the EU group. The Czech Republic
has the lowest index value and has a lower stringency index than the least
stringent country within the EU group which is Greece. The graphics
summarizes this information.
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33 For details, see appendix.Figure 13: Capital Regulatory Index
5.4.2 Supervision
5.4.2.1 Formal Supervisory Power
The index constructed to measure the formal supervisory power tries to
describe the legal possibilities of supervisors to prevent and correct problems
in the banking industry. The index captures formal power to take prompt
corrective action, to restructure and reorganize a troubled bank or to declare
a deeply troubled bank insolvent. For the broad picture we want to give here
we report the overall official supervisory power index as suggested by Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2001). The index ranges from 0 to 16 with higher values
indicating more official supervisory power. To construct the index for the
EU-15 group we lack all the information for Belgium, Portugal, Spain and the
U.K., which we therefore exclude from the EU observations. The summary
statistics for the remaining group give us the following picture.
Official Supervisory Power Index
Range: 0 – 16 (higher range means higher supervisory power)
EU (without Belgium, Portugal, Spain and U.K.)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
8 14 5 8 2 7.25 8 10
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Czech Republic Hungary Poland
12 15 11
The median within the EU group is at an index value of 8 with a median
deviation of two index points. Concerning the official supervisory power all
CEEC countries are above the EU median. Even more. They are all in the
upper quartile of the EU group. Thus the facts do not support the views that
the legal framework that has been put in place during the transition process
does not give enough formal power to supervisors. For instance Hungary –
according to the index – has almost the maximal supervisory power. This
information is again most compactly conveyed in our picture, which we show
below.
Figure 14: Official Supervisory Power Index
5.4.2.2 SupervisoryEnforcement:SupervisoryResourcesandSupervisory
Forbearance
Formal supervisory power is of course only effective if resources are
sufficient to guarantee an effective enforcement of rules. Even if resources are
sufficient, supervisors may engage in forbearance when confronted with
violations of regulations or imprudent behavior. We therefore complement the
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describing enforcement. The first set of indices simply describe some
numbers documenting supervisory resources. We report the number of
supervisors per bank and frequency of onsite examinations.
Let us first look at the number of supervisors per bank. For the EU group we
don’t have the data for France, Italy the Netherlands and Sweden. Our
summary statistics gives the following picture.
Supervisors per Bank
EU (without France, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
1 2.4 0.9 0.67 0.33 0.3 0.67 1
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
2 1 0.5
With respect to the number of supervisors per bank the Czech republic and
Hungary are both in the upper quartile of the EU distribution. In contrast
Poland is in the lower quartile.
Figure 15: Number of Supervisors per Bank
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inspections in large and medium site banks. The frequencies are reported as 1
for yearly as 2 for every two years etc. The EU group has the following
distribution of inspection frequencies. Here the values for France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the U.K are not available for the
EU group.
Frequency of onsite Inspections
EU (without France, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
2 6 1 2 0.75 2 2 4
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
1 2 1.5
We see that the CEEC-3 are all in the lower quartile of the EU distribution,
with Poland and the Czech Republic being below the median of the EU group.
This means that in the CEEC-3 group the onsite examination frequency is at
or above the median frequency in the EU-group as a whole.
Figure 16: Onsite Examination Frequency
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used and how effectively the regulatory rules are enforced in practice. This
variable ranges from 1 to 4 a higher value indicating more discretion. Again
we are missing the data for four countries within the EU group.
Supervisory Forbearance Discretion
Range: 0 – 4 (higher index means higher forbearance discretion)
EU (without Belgium, France, Germany and Portugal)
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
3 4 2 3 0 2.25 3 3
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
34 3
Figure 17: Supervisory Forbearance Discretion
We see that the Czech Republic and Poland are in the median of supervisory
forbearance. Hungary ranks above. The picture shows that the EU group
shows quite a bit of heterogeneity. For instance Austria and Spain rank as high
in supervisory forbearance as Hungary. The lowest ranks of forbearance can
be found in the U.K. and in Ireland.
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The last indicator attempts to give a description about the strength of market
discipline and incentives for private monitoring. What is striking is that the
EU group as a whole ranks rather low in this respect, if judged against the
possible range of the index.
Market Discipline and Private Monitoring
Range: 0 –  7 (higher index means higher market discipline and private
monitoring incentives)
EU
Modus Max Min Median Med-Dev. Quartiles
23 1 2 0 2 2 3
CEEC-3
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
22 2
Figure 18: Private Monitoring Incentives
From the graphic we can see that the CEEC-3 are all at the median of the EU
distribution.
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In this section, we have investigated three groups of indicators for the
regulatory and supervisory environment of the banking system based on data
provided by the World Bank.
Beginning with the capital stringency, we see that the regulatory framework
induces a weaker rank of capital stringency in the CEEC-3 than in the EU
median. Among the CEEC-3 the Czech republic ranks lowest in this respect
whereas Poland reaches the lower quartile of the EU distribution.
Looking at supervision, the picture we get is that the formal power of
supervisors is extremely strong at least as compared to the EU-15 group.
There is apparently also no lack of bank supervisors. However, when we look
at the enforcement side of supervision, we see that the frequency of onsite
examinations is rather low and forbearance discretion is rather high. This
suggests that supervisory resources are at the moment not efficiently used.
As far as market discipline and private monitoring incentives are concerned,
the whole CEEC-3 group reaches a relatively low rank but this rank perfectly
matches the EU median. As far as this index is concerned the EU as a group
does not rank very high, either.
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In this study we have analyzed the development of the Financial System in
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland during the last decade by focussing
on the banking system, stock and bond markets on the one hand and on the
structure of funding and the legal and supervisory environment for external
finance and banking supervision on the other hand. The broad picture shows
impressive achievements in the establishment of a modern financial system in
a relatively short period of time.
All countries covered by this study (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland)
experienced banking crises in the initial phase of transition which, however,
differed significantly in their extent. In general, the following factors may be
identified as the main causes: (1) An inherited burden of bad loans of the
state-owned commercial banks (which emanated from the old monobank
system). (2) A licensing policy that was mostly quite liberal coupled with
shortcomings in the legal framework and supervisory system. (3) Lack of
capital and banking skills. (4) Recessionary environment in the beginning of
transition. (5) Political intervention.
Banking crises were resolved in all countries by means of recapitalisation of
banks by the state. However, there are significant differences regarding the
extent of time and public funds that were consumed by the process of bank
recapitalisation. Recapitalisation was implemented most quickly and at lower
costs in Hungary and Poland, while this process was far more expensive and
protracted (up to the year 2000) in the Czech Republic, due to delayed
restructuring of the corporate sector.
Recapitalisation was quickly followed by privatization mainly in the form of
sales to strategic foreign investors in Hungary and in the Czech Republic. In
Poland, the time span between recapitalisation and privatisation was
considerably larger.
The current level of nonperforming loans in the CEEC-3 still seems to be
fairly high, in particular in the Czech Republic and in Poland. This has to be
explained not only by the legacy of the past, but also by the impact of
recession (in the Czech Republic) or a sharp slowdown of economic growth
(in Poland). However, as a consequence of full (or nearly completed)
77privatization of banks in these accession countries, the scope for further state
bailouts should be reduced greatly.
Profitability in the banking sector has been low in recent years (measured by
Return on Equity (RoE) in real terms), with the exception of Poland to some
degree. Low profitability was mainly caused by the following factors: (1)
Relatively sharp decline in interest rate margins (lending minus deposit rates),
that has been accelerated by increasing competition between resident banks
(domestically and foreign owned) as well as competition from cross-border
loans. (2) Minimum reserve requirements that were held too high for too long.
(3) Decreasing, but still rather high burden of non-performing loans (NPL).
(4) Probably management mistakes. However, in 2000, a significant increase
in profitability was recorded.
All countries in the group successfully established capital markets in the early
phase of transition. Looking back at the first decade of equity market
development, the strategy of first establishing an infrastructure and
a regulatory framework as chosen by Hungary and Poland turned out to be
more successful in the long run than the way chosen by the Czech Republic
which established first a rudimentary market without a special regulatory
infrastructure. The difference in development is expressed in the
comparatively higher liquidity and better performance of the Polish and
Hungarian stock markets.
The emergence of markets for local currency-denominated debt securities
was linked mainly to the management of public debt and the process of
macroeconomic stabilization. Private placements were made mainly in the
first half of the 1990s and were linked to (1) the recapitalization of
commercial banks, (2) the securitization of central bank loans denominated in
local currency to the central government, and (3) the conversion of foreign
currency-denominated government bonds held by the central bank into local
currency-denominated ones. Initially, privately placed bonds were mostly
nonmarketable; in the meantime, most of them have been transformed into
marketable bonds. In the second half of the 1990s markets, publicly issued
securities, comprising both marketable securities (T-bills, T-bonds) and
nonmarketable ones (retail securities), became clearly dominant. The share of
fixed-rate bonds with longer maturities in total debt market capitalization
increased, coupled with relatively high levels of market liquidity.
The financial sector shows already a significant degree of international
integration.
78 ConclusionsForeign ownership in the banking sector increased to levels of up to 75% of
total banking sector equity not only as a result of privatization transactions
and decreasing state ownership, but also because of (the growth of) newly
founded banks. Further consolidation in the banking sector may be expected
as a result of the increased competitive pressures in the banking sector.
Foreign participation in the equity markets is high in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, with foreign investors holding more than 50% of
portfolio market capitalization and accounting for more than 50% of
secondary market turnover. Foreign holdings of central government debt
securities increased in Hungary and Poland to a level of nearly 20% at the end
of 2000.
The size of CEEC-3 banking sectors is small not only because of lower levels
of GDP in these countries, but also in relation to GDP. In Hungary and
Poland, the level of banking assets to GDP is in the order of a quarter of EU
levels. In total, banking assets in the CEEC-3 amounted to only 41% of total
assets of the Austrian banking sector at the end of 2000. The small size of
banking sectors and of equity market capitalization in the CEEC-3 may be
viewed as suggesting a substantial growth potential. The smaller size of
markets for local currency-denominated debt securities (relative to GDP) in
the CEEC-3 in comparison with the most developed market economies is
attributable to the lower public debt burden in the CEEC-3 and to the higher
(inherited) share of foreign currency-denominated debt in total public debt.
In the field of corporate financing, domestic bank credit in the form of loans,
including the loans extended by resident foreign-owned banks, is still the
most important source of external corporate financing. The ratio of the stock
of domestic credit to the corporate sector to GDP (and to gross fixed capital
investment) steadily increased in the second half of the nineties in Hungary
and Poland after an initial steady fall in the first half of the decade. In the
Czech Republic, this ratio was high in the first half of the decade, but fell
significantly since 1997.
However, in Hungary and Poland, too, the importance of domestic bank
lending has considerably declined during the second half of the 1990s, when
measured by the ratio of new net domestic credit (increase in credit stock to
corporate sector) to gross fixed capital investment. This development may be
explained by several (partly interrelated) factors: (1) Improved self-financing
capacity of companies. (2) Improved lending control and risk assessment
coupled with tighter prudential regulations. (3) Insufficient increase in
domestic banks’ credit allocation efficiency, resulting at times in
Conclusions 79disproportionate credit restrictions, in particular against new private (small)
companies. (4) High real lending rates, in particular when measured against
the industrial PPI, as well as high minimum reserve requirements.
It seems that lending by resident (domestically or foreign-owned) commercial
banks did not sufficiently increase to meet the growing investment needs, as
the stock of cross-border lending by nonresident banks as well as
intercompany loans (from the parent company abroad) increased
considerably. In fact, sometimes domestic foreign-owned banks act not so
much as a lender themselves, but as a “broker” for credits to companies
extended by their foreign parent banks, in particular in case of large credit
volumes.
The net issuance volumes of corporate debt securities were comparatively
low, being roughly equal on both the domestic and the international market.
Equity-based financing (i.e. capital-raising public offers on the stock
exchange) was even lower, in fact nearly negligible.
It is noteworthy that the corporate sector’s gross and net foreign
currency-denominated liabilities (against the domestic banking sector and
external creditors) have risen strongly in recent years, as the share of domestic
foreign currency-denominated lending to the corporate sector in total domestic
credit to the corporate sector increased to up to 40% and foreign (i.e.
cross-border) credit to the corporate sector grew at much higher rate than
domestic credit to enterprises. Gross foreign currency-denominated credit
reached up to 67% of total domestic and foreign credit to the corporate sector,
and the corresponding net position (i.e. after deduction of both domestic
foreign currency deposits and foreign assets held by the corporate sector)
amounted to up to 49% at the end of 2000. This development probably reflects
both the export orientation and the expectation of a trend real appreciation
combined with sizeable positive real interest rates in local currency. This
“internationalization” of the financial intermediation to companies should be
taken into account when investigating the monetary transmission mechanism.
In our analysis of the structure of private sector’s funding, we compared the
CEEC-3 to two catching up economies in the EU, Portugal and Spain. We saw
that, in terms of GDP, the stock of domestic credit provided by resident banks
to private nonbanks was considerably lower, while the stock of foreign
cross-border credit granted by nonresident banks to private nonbanks was
equal to or even higher than in these reference countries at the end of 2000.
Moreover, the stock of foreign banks’ credit to private nonbanks had
80 Conclusionsincreased sharply in the CEEC-3, while it declined in Portugal and Spain. On
the other hand, the stock of cross border liabilities of resident banks was
lower in the CEEC-3 than in Portugal and Spain. Among the CEEC-3, the
Czech banks’cross-border liabilities were by far the highest (relative to GDP)
and, in addition, mainly consisted in short-term liabilities, as in Portugal and
Spain. This corresponds to the early and comprehensive liberalization of the
capital account in the Czech Republic. However, while in Portugal and Spain
the liberalization of short-term capital flows led to a huge inflow of
short-term capital to refund resident banks, fueling the growth of domestic
credit to the private nonfinancial sector and partially substituting
(predominantly medium- and long-term) cross-border credit granted by
nonresident banks to private nonbanks, the Czech Republic showed
a different pattern. There, domestic credit growth does not seem to have been
enhanced by the inflow of short-term capital to banks, while (medium- and
long-term) cross-border credit by nonresident banks to private nonbanks grew
in parallel to that inflow. This seems to indicate that the domestic banking
system could not efficiently handle and absorb the additional funding to
successfully compete with these foreign cross-border credits to private
nonbanks. In view of these developments, the full liberalization of capital
flows may be regarded as premature in the Czech Republic.
In the field of public financing, the capital market plays an important
intermediating role, in contrast to the role of capital markets in corporate
financing. Publicly issued central government debt securities denominated in
local currency markedly grew in importance, as they were the main source of
financing current budget deficits. On the demand side, the growing role of
privat nonbanks and foreign investors as holders of debt securities means that
the issuance of debt securities and the debt securities market have really
become an additional channel of financial intermediation.
Assessing the vulnerability of the financial sector, the economy’s external (or,
more broadly, foreign currency-denominated) liabilities as well as foreign
investors’ portfolio holdings of local currency-denominated debt and equity
securities have to be taken into account.
Banks’short-term external liabilities in relation to gross official reserves were
rather low in Poland and in Hungary, what may be explained partly by the
high foreign ownership in this sector and by capital account restrictions still
in place at the end of 2000. In the Czech Republic, they reached a level of
about 50%.
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and equity securities relative to gross official reserves seem to have been at
a non-critical level at the end of 2000, despite increased or even strong
foreign participation in domestic capital markets. Moreover, the strong
presence of foreign investors in accession countries’stock markets reduce the
scope for wealth effects resulting from a fall in stock prices for the domestic
economy.
While the ongoing process of capital account liberalisation in CEECs may
lead to sudden changes in the ratios between official reserves and measures of
potential outflows, short-term inflows are discouraged by the exchange rate
risks that result from the flexible exchange rate regimes which are in place in
these countries. In addition, the flexibility of the exchange rate regimes in
place may limit the impact of sudden capital outflows on the gross official
reserves.
On the other hand, at the end of 2000, the corporate sector’s (net) foreign
currency-denominated liabilities (against the domestic banking sector and
external creditors) seem to have exceeded levels warranted by the use of
these positions as a hedging tool for companies that have foreign
exchange-denominated export earnings. Therefore, downward corrections of
the (flexible) exchange rate would negatively affect the costs of debt servicing
of companies and thus increase the credit risk for the banking sector.
With regard to vulnerability, the small size of CEE banking sectors is an
advantage, as the costs of bank failures would be limited in size in relation to
the real economy of the respective country as well as for Euro area financial
institutions engaged in the accession countries. Similarly, the still relatively
small size of domestic capital markets in the CEEC-3 and their modest role in
corporate financing can be viewed as limiting the vulnerability risks involved.
Finally, we have looked at the legal environment and at banking supervision.
With respect to legislation conductive to the availability of external finance,
we see that the law gives strong rights to shareholders and is in line with many
European countries as far as creditor rights are concerned. The weak spot
seems to be more in the general quality of law enforcement where the
CEEC-3 rank uniformly below the countries in the European Union.
Going to banking regulation and supervision, we see a similar picture.
Compared to the EU group, the CEEC-3 rank relatively low in terms of
82 Conclusionscapital stringency assessed as the amount of general restrictions on the
leverage potential for capital. In supervision, the formal power of supervisors
is extremely strong. However, when we look at the enforcement side of
supervision we see that the potential for forbearance is rather high and the
frequency of onsite examinations is rather low. This suggests that supervisory
resources are at the moment not efficiently used. As far as market discipline
and private monitoring incentives are concerned, the whole CEEC-3 group
reaches a relatively low rank but this rank is pretty similar to the EU group
which doesn’t achieve high ranks of this index either.
The bottom line of our study is that the first decade of financial system
transition in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was characterized by
impressive and sometimes spectacular progress. The banking system still
suffers from past burden. The size of the banking sectors as well as of the
equities markets and the corporate debt securities markets (relative to GDP)
is still small as compared to developed market economies. The regulatory and
supervisory infrastructure is formally well developed but mainly suffers from
various enforcement problems. The effective solution to these problems will
be instrumental for fully realizing the sizeable growth potential of the banking
sector and the capital markets and their contributions to real growth in the
future. It is our hope that our study provides some significant facts that help
to structure the debate on how these goals can be most effectively achieved.
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Data Sources 89Appendix: Description of Indicators
Creditor Rights: The Index is constructed by adding 1 or 0 to the following
questions depending on whether the answer is yes or no. Index ranges from
0 to 4, higher index means stronger position of creditors.
(1) The country imposes restrictions, such as creditor’s consent or minimum
dividends, to file for reorganization.
(2) Secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay).
(3) The debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending on
the resolution of the reorganization.
(4) Secured Creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that
result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm.
Questionnaire taken from La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1135. For a more detailed
justification for this index see La Porta et al. (1996) pp. 22-24.
Shareholder Rights: The Index is constructed by adding 1 or 0 to the
following questions depending on whether the answer is yes or no. Index
ranges from 0 to 4, higher index means stronger position of shareholders.
(1) The Country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote.
(2) Shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General
Shareholder Meeting.
(3) Cumulative Voting is allowed.
(4) An oppressed minority mechanism is in place.
(5) The minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to
call for an Extraordinary Shareholder meeting is less or equal to 10 %.
Questionnaire taken from La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1134. For a more detailed
justification for this index see La Porta et al. (1996) pp. 16-18.
Law and Order: Range from 0 to 6. In our paper variable is rescaled to range
0 to 10. The manual of the International Country Risk guide describes the
variable as follows: “ Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-
component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the
order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.”
91Corruption: Range from 0 to 6. In our paper variable is rescaled to range 0
to 10. The manual to the International Country risk reports describes the
difficult nature of assessing such a usually hidden phenomenon as corruption.
They remain rather vague about how exactly the index is constructed. One
proxy that goes into the index, explicitly mentioned in the manual is the fact
of how long a government has been in power continuously.
Investment Profile: Range from 0 to 12. According to the manual of PRS the
variable is described as follows. “This is a measure of the government’s
attitude to inward investment as determined by four sub-components. The risk
to operations, taxation, repatriation and labor costs.” La Porta et al. (1996)
used the variables: “Risk of expropriation” and “repudiation of contracts by
government”. Upon request Mrs. Nora Ruthig from PRS gave us the
following information: “ ...the methodology changed at the end of 1997. The
two components of which you speak, Risk of Expropriation and Contract
Viability aka Repudiation of Contracts which were in the Financial Risk Table
are now along with the old Economic Risk component “Collection
Experience” part of the Investment Profile.” (personal correspondence).
Capital Regulatory Index: The Index is constructed by adding 1 or 0
depending on whether the answer to the following questions is yes or no.
Index ranges from 0 to 8. Questions cited from Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001,
pp. 17-18.
(1) Does the minimum required capital to asset ration conform to the Basle
guidelines?
(2) Does the minimum ratio vary with market risk?
(3) Is the market value of loan losses deducted from reported accounting
capital?
(4) Are unrealized losses in the securities portfolio deducted from reported
accounting capital?
(5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted from reported
accounting capital?
(6) Can initial and subsequent infusions of regulatory capital include assets
other than cash or governement securities?
(7) Can the initial infusion of capital be based on borrowed funds?
(8) Are the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital verified by the
regulatory or supervisory authority?
92 AppendixOfficial Supervisory Power Index: The Index is constructed by adding 1
or 0 depending on whether the answer to the following questions is yes or no.
Index ranges from 0 to 16. Questions cited from Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001,
pp.18-19.
(1) Can supervisors meet with any external auditors to discuss their reports
without bank approval?
(2) Are auditors legally required to report any misconduct by managers or
directors to the supervisory authorities?
(3) Can the supervisory authority take legal action against external
auditors for negligence?
(4) Can the supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal
organizational structure?
(5) Can the deposit insurance agency take legal action against bank
directors or officers?
(6) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the supervisory authorities?
(7) Does failure to abide by a cease-desist type order lead to the automatic
imposition of civil and penal sanctions on the directors and managers
of a bank?
(8) Can the supervisory authorities order a bank’s directors’ decision to
distribute dividends?
(9) Can the supervisory authorities suspend the directors’ decision to
distribute dividends?
(10) Can the supervisory authority suspend the directors’ decision to
distribute bonuses?
(11) Can the supervisory authority suspend the directors’ decision to
distribute management fees?
(12) Can the supervisory authority supercede shareholder rights and declare
a bank insolvent?
(13) Can the supervisory authorities suspend some or all ownership rights of
a problem bank?
(14) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory
authorities supercede shareholder rights?
(15) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory
authorities remove and replace management?
(16) Regarding bank restructuring and reorgaization can the supervisory
authorities remove and replace directors?
Appendix 93Supervisory forbearance discretion: The Index is constructed by adding 1
or 0 depending on whether the answer to the following questions is yes or no.
Index ranges from 0 to 4. Questions cited from Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001,
p. 20.
(1) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory
authorities or any other government agency forbear certain prudential
regulations?
(2) Are there pre-determined levels of solvency deterioration that force
automatic actions, such as intervention?
(3) Must infractions of any prudential regulations be reported?
(4) With respect to (3) are there mandatory actions to be taken in these
cases?
Private Monitoring Index: The Index is constructed as follows: Questions
cited from Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001, p. 23.
(1) Is an external Audit required and if so by a certified or licensed auditor?
(1 if both criteria are fulfilled 0 otherwise)
(2) The percentage of to 10 banks that are rated by international credit
rating agencies. (1 if percentage is 100, 0 otherwise)
(3) Does income statement include accrued or unpaid interest or principal
on nonperforming loans? Are banks requires to produce consolidated
financial statements including nonbanks, financial affiliates or
subsidiaries? (1 if all three criteria are fulfilled, 0 otherwise)
(4) Is there no explicit deposit insurance scheme and were depositors not
wholly compensated the last tome a bank failed? (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
(5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public?
(6) Must banks disclose risk management procedures to the public?
(7) Is subordinated debt allowable (required) as part of regulatory capital?
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Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems,
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other
practitioners in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of
analysing and understanding European financial markets, institutions and
systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises
regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes several
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located
at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate
and personal membership fees. Corporate membership currently includes
major European financial institutions and Central Banks. SUERF is strongly
supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership comprises most of
Europe’s Central Banks (29 in total, including the Bank for International
Settlements and the European Central Bank), banks, other financial
institutions and academics.
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